\u3cem\u3eRoe\u3c/em\u3e\u27s Effects on Family Law by Kohm, Lynne Marie
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 71 | Issue 2 Article 22
Spring 3-1-2014
Roe's Effects on Family Law
Lynne Marie Kohm
Regent University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Law and Gender
Commons
This Session 5 is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation




Roe’s Effects on Family Law 
Lynne Marie Kohm* 
Table of Contents 
 I. Introduction ................................................................... 1339 
 II. Roe’s Effects on the Parent–Child Relationship ........... 1342 
 III. Roe’s Effects on Marriage and the Spousal  
  Relationship ................................................................... 1361 
 IV. Roe’s Effects on Sexuality, Romance, and the  
  Family Generally ........................................................... 1369 
 V. Conclusion ...................................................................... 1383 
I. Introduction 
Family law deals with the regulation of the most sensitive 
relationships in our lives—those between wives and husbands, 
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between parents and children, and between people who share a 
household. Family law regulates entry into family status 
relationships, such as marriage, and the ways to get out of them, 
such as divorce. It regulates the ongoing nature of those 
relationships including duties, obligations, rights, and privileges 
vested in the members of a family by virtue of their relationships 
with one another.1 
Generally, state domestic relations law balances two distinct 
and opposite ends of liberty interests, both of which are of 
paramount importance to the state: the preservation of family 
privacy and the protection of individual members of a family. The 
competition between these two positions has been highlighted in 
the wake of Roe v. Wade.2 Family law has experienced some 
dramatic changes in the forty years since this landmark decision. 
The ease of obtaining a divorce has increased,3 while the 
statutory requirements for entering into marriage are undergoing 
alteration,4 and more individuals are opting out of marriage in 
favor of cohabitation.5 Parenting rights and duties have changed, 
                                                                                                     
 1. Other large aspects of family law include property distribution, spousal 
support, and child custody, but as those areas seem to have minimal interface 
with abortion, they are not discussed in this article. 
 2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973) (balancing the right to 
privacy in the familial context, which encompasses a woman’s decision on 
“whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,” against the legitimate state 
interest of protecting maternal health and protecting “potential” prenatal life). 
Roe has highlighted the competing interests of individual rights and family 
interests by sometimes potentially setting family members against one another. 
This Article seeks to set forth how Roe has possibly worked to increase conflicts 
between husbands and wives, and between parents and children, but also how 
those potential conflicts alter the interests of the family as a unit, drawing the 
state into those intimate family relationships. 
 3. See Jonathan Gruber, Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The 
Long-Run Implications of Unilateral Divorce, 22 J. LAB. ECON. 799, 799 (2004) 
(using forty years of census data to confirm that unilateral divorce regulations—
involving laws that do not require explicit consent from both partners to obtain 
a divorce—significantly increase the incidence of divorce). 
 4. For a review of the changing nature of requirements for entering into 
marriage, from federal and state regulation to litigation, see generally Mark 
Strasser, Windsor, Federalism, and the Future of Marriage Litigation, 37 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER ONLINE 1, 23–28 (2013), http://harvardjlg.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/11/Strasser_Windsor_Federalism_and_the_Future_of_Marriage_L
itigation.pdf. 
 5. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Why Marriage Is Still the Best Default in 
Estate Planning Conflicts, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1219, 1243 n.129 (2013) 
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and rights and privileges of children have been altered.6 This 
article examines whether, how, and why any of those changes are 
related to Roe. 
Roe’s effects on these matters of family law warrant review. 
Part II begins with a discussion of changes to the parent–child 
relationship since Roe v. Wade. It investigates the regulation of 
parenting rights, duties, and choices, and the liberty interests of 
children to receive loving and valued parenting, using both 
statutory code and popular jurisprudence. Part III considers the 
changes in marriage since Roe. This Part examines marriage 
rights and privileges, focusing on how spousal roles are different 
than they were prior to Roe. Relationships between members 
within a household, sexuality regulation, and judicial decision-
making in family law generally are the focus of Part IV. Finally, 
Part V offers some conclusions as to Roe’s effect on family law. 
Forty years after Roe, alterations to family law include an 
expansion of the concept of increasing individuality and a 
contracting sense of community, and both are at least somewhat 
connected to abortion rights and regulations.7 This Article seeks 
                                                                                                     
(discussing Census data indicating that a significant and growing percentage of 
the U.S. population comprises unmarried households).  
 6. See generally Mary Ann Mason, The Roller Coaster of Child Custody 
Law over the Last Half Century, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAWS. 451 (2013) 
(citing Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the 
Child Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. FAM. STUD. 337 (2008)). 
 7. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN 
TRADITION: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1987) (contrasting 
American individualism with the European emphasis on community to proffer 
that the legal tradition in the United States, since abortion jurisprudence (and 
divorce reform), has become more individualistic by incorporating the “right to 
be let alone” and viewing individuals as “lone rights bearers”). In Katherine 
Bartlett’s review of Glendon’s book, she characterizes Glendon’s view of the 
intrafamily conflict that abortion laws have created between a mother and her 
child:  
Glendon focuses on the contrasting symbolism of the American and 
European approaches: while American abortion law reflects the 
triumph of women’s liberty rights over a nonperson/fetus, abortion 
law in other Western nations communicates a message of active 
societal concern for fetal life along with compassion for the pregnant 
woman and a commitment to minimizing the impact of her “tragic 
choices.”  
Katherine T. Bartlett, Story Telling, 1987 DUKE L.J. 760, 761 (reviewing 
GLENDON, supra note 7) (citations omitted). These ideas are developed further in 
Part III of this Article. 
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to demonstrate that these alterations to family law and 
jurisprudence have generally affected the family as an 
institution. This expansion and contraction in family law as a 
whole has included seismic shifts in fundamental foundations of 
familial relations from what were previously understood, 
particularly between spouses, between parents and children, and 
between women and men.8 While all those changes are not 
necessarily a direct result of Roe, the decision’s influence is 
undeniable. 
II. Roe’s Effects on the Parent–Child Relationship 
Historic recognition of broad parental authority to raise 
children made the family the basic social, economic, and political 
unit.9 Historically, parental rights were understood in property 
terms, and parents possessed virtually unlimited control over 
their offspring.10 Parents were presumed to be protectors of their 
children’s best interests.11 The state had an interest in the 
                                                                                                     
 8. Professor David Smolin has considered some of these shifts in human 
relationships brought on by abortion law in a jurisprudential context. See David 
M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 
MARQ. L. REV. 975, 980–83 (1992) (analyzing Supreme Court abortion and 
homosexuality jurisprudence and determining that a faction of the Court erred 
in creating “certain implicit constitutional understandings about the 
relationship between government and the family”). Smolin analyzes that 
jurisprudence in terms of the conflict between a woman and her fetus and the 
State, which may wish to protect either of them. Id. at 1015. He also looks at 
women’s reproductive freedoms as compared to men’s and the connection 
between abortion jurisprudence and parental rights, noting the “elevation of 
abortion to a virtually super-protected right and the simultaneous rejection of 
claims based on parental control over birth and education.” Id. at 1015. These 
notions are also developed further throughout this Article. 
 9. See David Wagner, The Family and American Constitutional Law, 1 
LIBERTY, LIFE & FAM. 145, 157–67 (1994) (discussing this historical basis in the 
context of the development of individualism through American constitutional 
case law); Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: 
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” 1976 BYU L. 
REV. 605, 613–19 (1976) (discussing the history of and concerns with the 
parents’ rights versus children’s rights conundrum).  
 10. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 225 (3d ed. 1995) 
(“Historically, parental . . . power over offspring until the age of majority . . . was 
all but unlimited and unchecked.”). 
 11. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of 
the Child Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 
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preservation of family strength and privacy.12 When Roe legalized 
the right to abortion, these notions were changed, revising the 
parent−child relationship in completely new ways and removing 
parents from the equation when abortion was involved as a choice 
for a child. 
New laws affecting the parent–child relationship were 
developed, at least somewhat, in response to Roe.13 
Pennsylvania’s laws to protect the parent–child relationship 
when making a choice about abortion, among other laws 
regulating the abortion right, were challenged in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.14 While 
upholding Roe’s basic right to abortion, Casey found laws that 
restricted abortion, such as those requiring informed consent, 
minimum requirements for clinical facilities providing abortion, 
and parental notification for minors seeking abortions to be 
constitutional.15 Based on the privacy and liberty interests 
founded in Roe, new notions, albeit of much more limited 
parental involvement in a child’s abortion, became significant. 
Many state and federal restrictions on abortion in the United 
                                                                                                     
345−52 (2008) (tracing the history of the best interest standard as related to 
parental rights). 
 12. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, 
and Sexual Privacy: Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. 
REV. 463, 493–94 (1983) (noting that the Supreme Court recognized the state’s 
interest in formal marriage because of the importance society places on family). 
 13. See Steve Alumbaugh & C.K. Rowland, The Links Between Platform-
Based Appointment Criteria and Trial Judges’ Abortion Judgments, 74 
JUDICATURE 153, 157 (1990) (noting that “state legislatures have passed 
hundreds of laws designed to circumvent or limit the scope and breadth of” Roe, 
including a number of provisions that impact familial relationships, including 
spousal consent and parental consent laws). For a summary of state attempts to 
regulate abortion in the era following Roe, see ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY 
WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 997–1006 (3d ed. 1995). 
 14. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) 
(describing several Pennsylvania state laws, all of which were passed after Roe 
was decided).  
 15. See id. at 899 (upholding a law permitting minors to obtain an abortion 
only after receiving parental consent or, in special cases, court approval). The 
Court struck down a requirement for spousal notification. See id. at 895–98 
(explaining why the state may not require a husband’s approval for his wife to 
have an abortion). For a review of how Casey brought abortion liberty and 
regulation to a head, see generally Lynne Marie Kohm & Colleen Holmes, The 
Rise and Fall of Women’s Rights: Have Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom 
Forfeited Victory?, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 381 (2000).  
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States were in place before Roe.16 Because Roe was relatively 
silent as to a minor’s abortion decision, an inference could be 
drawn that Roe permitted abortion on demand for a minor child 
without the protection that family involvement provides.17 
Pennsylvania’s response was to establish a law designed to 
protect the best interests of a child through a parent’s 
involvement in his or her child’s abortion decision.18 Montana 
                                                                                                     
 16. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY 
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 72–80 (2005) (describing those 
restrictions in place prior to Roe); Stephen P. Rosenberg, Note, Splitting the 
Baby: When Can a Pregnant Minor Obtain an Abortion Without Parental 
Consent? The Ex Parte Anonymous Cases (Alabama 2001), 34 CONN. L. REV. 
1109, 1109 (2002) (describing how the Supreme Court refused to answer the 
question of parental involvement in Roe, effectively mandating that states fill 
the regulatory gap if they wanted parents involved in the abortion decisions of 
their children).  
 17. Roe seems to offer implicit approval for the availability of abortion on 
demand for a minor child (without mention of parental involvement). See 
Charles E. Rice, Abortion: What Did the Supreme Court Do in Roe v. Wade? 5−6, 
in LIFE & LEARNING IX, http://www.uffl.org/vol%209/rice9.pdf 
According to Roe, even after viability, when the state may regulate 
and even prohibit abortion, the state may not prohibit abortion 
“where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the 
preservation of the life or health of the mother.” The health of the 
mother includes her psychological as well as physical well-being. And 
“the medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors—
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—
relevant to the well-being of the mother.” This is equivalent to a 
sanction for permissive abortion at every stage of pregnancy. 
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). These statements from Roe and Doe, 
analyzed here by Professor Rice, intimate that the age of the woman seeking the 
abortion is relevant to her wellbeing, permitting abortion on demand for a 
woman of any age if her wellbeing is at issue. See also Gary-Nw. Ind. Women’s 
Srvcs., Inc. v. Bowen, 421 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (where pre-Roe 
provisions of the Indiana Abortion Law requiring parental consent were held to 
be unconstitutional). “Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being 
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as 
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional 
rights.” Id. at 736. The separate concurring statement of District Judge Allen 
Sharp draws the position of a minor’s right to abortion on demand during the 
first trimester into better focus. “[O]ur highest Court has now vested in a 
mother, regardless of age or parental or marital consent, the absolute right to 
terminate human life in a clearly identifiable form during the first three months 
of its existence . . . .” Id. 
 18. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(a) (2013) (mandating parental 
involvement in a minor’s abortion decision via an informed consent 
requirement). This law states:  
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passed legislation specifically noting that parental involvement 
serves a child’s best interests.19  
Other states have responded to the opportunity presented by 
Casey with regulatory schemes that fall into three categories: 
those protecting parental consent,20 those requiring parental 
notification,21 and those schemes that mandate both notification 
                                                                                                     
Except in the case of a medical emergency, or except as provided in 
this section, if a pregnant woman is less than 18 years of age and not 
emancipated, or if she has been adjudged an incapacitated person 
under 20 Pa.C.S. § 5511 (relating to petition and hearing; 
independent evaluation), a physician shall not perform an abortion 
upon her unless, in the case of a woman who is less than 18 years of 
age, he first obtains the informed consent both of the pregnant 
woman and of one of her parents; or, in the case of a woman who is an 
incapacitated person, he first obtains the informed consent of her 
guardian. In deciding whether to grant such consent, a pregnant 
woman's parent or guardian shall consider only their child’s or ward’s 
best interests. In the case of a pregnancy that is the result of incest 
where the father is a party to the incestuous act, the pregnant woman 
need only obtain the consent of her mother. 
Id. 
 19. MONT CODE ANN. § 50-20-502 (2013) (noting that “parents ordinarily 
possess information essential to . . . [support a] physician’s best medical 
judgment,” that parents can ensure that their children receive “adequate 
medical care” after an abortion, and that “parental consultation is usually 
desirable and in the best interests of the minor”). The Montana Legislature 
stated that the “purpose of this part is to further the important and compelling 
state interests of . . . protecting minors against their own immaturity” and 
“fostering family unity,” as well as “preserving the family as a viable social 
unit.” Id. 
 20. Parental consent laws can be found in ALA. CODE § 26-21-3 (2013); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-803 (2013); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-609A (2013); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
6705 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (LexisNexis 2013); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12S (2013); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 722.903(1) (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-53 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 188.028(1) (2013); MONT CODE ANN. § 50-20-504 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-
6902 (2012) (requiring written notarized consent); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.7(a) 
(2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.121 
(LexisNexis 2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(a) (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 
(2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-31 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-303 (2013); 
WIS. STAT. § 48.375 (2012). 
 21. Parental notification laws can be found in ALASKA STAT. 
§ 18.16.020(a)(1) (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-37.5-104 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 24, § 1783(1) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 390.01114 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-
682 (2014); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/15 (2013); IOWA CODE § 135L.3 (2014); MD. 
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103 (LexisNexis 2013); MINN. STAT. § 144.343 
(2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:33 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7 
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and consent.22 These laws largely protect a parent’s intercession 
in his or her child’s abortion decision, but challenges to these 
laws have continued since Casey because of Roe. For example, in 
July of 2013 the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously upheld the 
Illinois Parental Notification Act of 1995, following thirteen years 
of litigation over whether underage young women may gain the 
protection of notification of a parent before undergoing an 
abortion.23 The court held that the “[s]tate has a strong and 
legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose 
immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes 
impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely.”24  
Family law in this area of parent–child relations has gone 
from unconstrained parental rights to the emergence of new 
rights for children against their parents (because of Roe) and 
parents against their children (in Casey). Roe has positioned 
children and parents against each other, breaking down this 
important family relationship, while also developing an entirely 
new area of family law. 
Counter-balanced against parental rights restricted by Roe is 
the enlargement of the mature minor doctrine, which since Roe 
has expanded a child’s privacy and liberty interests.25 Generally 
                                                                                                     
(2013); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3 (2013). 
 22. State laws mandating both parental notification and parental consent 
include OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §1-740.2 (2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.002 (West 
2013); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-304, -304.5 (LexisNexis 2013); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16.1-241 (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118 (2013). 
 23. See Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 991 N.E.2d 745, 769 (Ill. 
2013) (holding that the law does not violate “state constitutional guarantees of 
due process and equal protection”); Naomi Nix, Illinois Supreme Court Backs 
Parental Notification for Abortions, CHI. TRIB. (July 13, 2012), http://articles. 
chicagotribune.com/2013-07-11/news/chi-abortion-parental-notification-201307 
11_1_illinois-supreme-court-said-lorie-chaiten-parental-notifica tion (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2014) (reporting on the central holding of Flores and responses to the 
ruling by pro-life and pro-choice advocacy groups) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 24. Flores, 991 N.E.2d at 767 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 
(1990)).  
 25. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 451–52 n.49 (1981) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“The ‘mature minor’ doctrine permits a child to consent to medical 
treatment if he is capable of appreciating its nature and consequences.”). In his 
dissent in Matheson, Justice Marshall discussed the two positions taken by the 
Justices after Roe on whether “mature” minors had a sufficient privacy interest 
in their abortion decisions to invalidate parental notification laws. See id. 
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within family law, states defer to parents who are the legal 
authority to make decisions regarding the medical treatment of 
their children.26 However, many jurisdictions have carved out an 
area of law that permits minors to statutorily determine their 
own medical treatment if that minor is mature enough and 
individually competent, according to a judge’s discretion, to 
understand the possible risks and benefits of the proposed 
medical procedure.27 Much of this privacy jurisprudence was 
developed in case law prior to Roe.28 Shortly after Roe, the United 
States Supreme Court determined that, as a matter of 
constitutional law, a mature minor must be permitted to make 
her own decision whether to terminate her pregnancy.29 The 
                                                                                                     
(outlining Justice Powell’s position that notification statutes were constitutional 
if they provided individualized determinations of the decision-making capacity 
of the mature minor, and Justice Steven’s position that such judicial 
determinations unconstitutionally infringed on the mature minor’s privacy). 
 26. See PETER N. SWISHER, LAWRENCE D. DIEHL & JAMES R. COTTRELL, 
FAMILY LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE AND FORMS § 5.5 (2013)  
The general rule with medical . . . care for children is that the parents 
ultimately decide whether medical care is to be provided for the child 
and what that care is to be. This general rule, however, is not 
absolute. The parents still owe their minor children the duty to 
provide adequate medical care, or the parents may be guilty of child 
abuse. 
(providing that a failure to secure medical attention for an injured child is a 
Class 1 misdemeanor, with a Christian Science practitioner exception (citing VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-314 (2013))). 
 27. See Lois A. Weithorn, Developmental Factors and Competence to Make 
Informed Treatment Decisions, in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILD AND YOUTH 
SERVICES 85, 88 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1982) (enumerating the mature minor 
exception and giving examples of applicable standards for “maturity” from 
statutes and jurisprudence). 
 28. See Walter Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Medical 
Consent, 11 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 115, 117−20 (1973) (summarizing the case law 
pertaining to consent to very basic medical care by a minor). 
 29. See Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (concluding that every 
minor “must have the opportunity” for a court to determine whether they are 
mature enough to make an abortion decision on her own without requiring 
parental notification or consultation as a preliminary step); Planned Parenthood 
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72, 75 (1976) (holding unconstitutional consent 
requirement for all unmarried minor abortions during the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy because it infringed on the “weighty” right to privacy possessed by 
“competent minor[s] mature enough to have become pregnant”). Similarly, the 
Court held in Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), that minors 
cannot be denied access to contraceptives, both over the counter and medically 
prescribed. Id. at 681–82. 
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mature minor doctrine expanded rights for girls seeking an 
abortion, but it has not necessarily been applied to boys in their 
medical treatment decision-making.30 Others suggest that equal 
protection of boys and girls with regard to mature minor laws 
cannot be applied similarly to boys and girls because pregnancy 
requires that an autonomous liberty interest be afforded to a girl 
(because her body carries the child),31 which is unavailable to a 
boy by virtue of procreative differences.32 Still others have argued 
that the unborn children who are being illegally aborted deserve 
the protection of counsel in the form of a court-appointed 
guardian ad litem.33  
Roe changed the parent–child relationship; the development 
of the mature minor doctrine and parental notification and 
consent laws, a response to Roe, also changed the relationship 
between parent and child. These regulations brought about 
parenting limits that provide for a child to judicially bypass her 
parents to seek an abortion under certain circumstances.34 The 
                                                                                                     
 30.  See, e.g., ‘Abraham’s Law’ Clears Virginia Senate Panel, 4 VA. MED. L. 
REP. 18, 18 (2007), http://valawyersweekly.com/wp-files/pdf/VMLRJan2007.pdf 
(discussing the origin of “Abraham’s Law,” the opposition to it, and the potential 
harm to all children). A judge ordered a 16-year-old boy, Starchild Abraham 
Cherrix, to take chemotherapy treatments to which he did not consent. Id. 
Although an agreement was eventually reached between social services and 
Abraham’s attorneys to prevent this forced chemotherapy, Abraham would have 
been required to take the chemotherapy but for the agreement. Id. 
 31. See, e.g., Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Note, Where Privacy Fails: Equal 
Protection and the Abortion Rights of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 637–38 
(1993) (noting the difficulty in applying traditional equal protection 
jurisprudence to laws that classify on the basis of biological differences).  
 32. For a comprehensive review of the case law, see generally Martin 
Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
589 (2002). 
 33. See Mark H. Bonner & Jennifer A. Sheriff, A Child Needs a Champion: 
Ad Litem Representation for Prenatal Children, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
511, 554 n.216, 555 (2013) (arguing that “hundreds, if not thousands” of illegal 
abortions could be prevented each year by the appointment of fetal guardians ad 
litem and listing state statutes pertaining to parental consent to an abortion for 
their minor child). 
 34. ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.020(a)(2) (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-804 
(2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783(2) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-682 
(2014); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(d) (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(b) (2012); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3) (LexisNexis 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:1299.35.5 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12S (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 722.903(2) (2013); MINN. STAT. § 144.343(6) (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 41-41-53(3) (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.028(2) (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-
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lack of encouraging minors to consult with their own parents 
before undergoing an abortion procedure shows the disjointed 
nature of the parent–child relationship since Roe.35 
The progression of the mature minor doctrine fostered 
competing interests between children and parents not fully 
contemplated before Roe. Professor Helen Alvaré suggests that 
parents “ought to be reinserted in decisions about whether their 
minor children will receive health care or even surgery in the 
forms of contraception and abortion.”36 She argues that the law 
“should stop indicating to minors that they are capable of gauging 
the full effects of premarital sexual involvement, parenting or 
abortion, without parental guidance.”37 By judicially removing 
the parent and his or her love and guidance from the child in 
certain circumstances, such as a stressful surgery like abortion, 
the child may be placed in a dangerous situation without needed 
support. Alvaré also argues that these new, additional laws affect 
a child’s premarital sexual behavior, while also sending the 
message that adolescents are competent to “discern their own 
sexual values.”38 For example, judicial bypass laws allow a 
pregnant minor seeking an abortion to convince a judge, whom 
she is meeting for the first time, that she is mature enough to 
                                                                                                     
6903 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.7(b) (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-
03.1(2) (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.121(C) (LexisNexis 2013); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 3206(c) (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 44-41-32 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-4 
(2013); WIS. STAT. § 48.375 (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118(b) (2013). Two 
states provide for a physician waiver of the notice requirement: MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103 (LexisNexis 2013); and W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3 (2013). 
Delaware, West Virginia, and Wisconsin allow a specified health professional to 
determine a waiver of parental consent or notice. See State Policies in Brief: An 
Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST., Feb. 1, 2014, at 3, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf (providing an 
overview chart listing state policies). 
 35. For an overview of these laws by state, see State Abortion Laws: A 
Survey, MSU.EDU, https://www.msu.edu/user/schwenkl/abtrbng/stablw.htm (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2012) [hereinafter MSU State Abortion Law Survey] (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); State Policies in Brief: An Overview of 
Abortion Laws, supra note 34, at 2–3. 
 36. Helen M. Alvaré, Saying “Yes” Before Saying “I Do”: Premarital Sex and 
Cohabitation as a Piece of the Divorce Puzzle, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 7, 64 (2004). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 56. 
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make her own abortion assessment.39 There is a large segment of 
society that perceives this to be an infringement on their ability 
to directly influence the upbringing of their children regarding 
premarital sexual decision-making.40 
Roe has also affected the parent–child relationship in terms 
of child support. Roe introduced intent to become a parent as a 
factor in assigning child support obligations and thereby gave 
parents a rationale for avoiding responsibilities to their 
children.41 Roe allows mothers to eliminate the obligation to 
support children they did not intend to conceive but does not 
extend the same ability to fathers.42 In reaction to this disparity, 
fathers have advanced two main arguments rooted in the intent 
to parent rationale to likewise avoid child support obligations. 
The first type of argument draws from equal protection 
jurisprudence,43 and the second relies on a fraud analysis.44  
First, fathers posit a post-Roe dichotomy that, they argue, 
constitutes a violation of equal protection: while a mother can 
avoid all legal obligations of parenthood by having an abortion, a 
father cannot avoid the legal obligation of child support, even 
when the mother has the child against his wishes.45 Courts have 
                                                                                                     
 39. See id. (explaining how judicial bypass laws work and their prevalence). 
 40. See id. at 83 (“It is an understatement to conclude that parents likely 
perceive weakening social support for communicating and enforcing teachings 
on premarital sex to their children.”). 
 41. See generally Laura W. Morgan, Child Support Fifty Years Later, 42 
FAM. L.Q. 365 (2008) (discussing child support in the abortion context); Sally 
Sheldon, Unwilling Fathers and Abortion: Terminating Men’s Child Support 
Obligations?, 66 MOD. L. REV. 175 (2003) (affording a rationale to exempt men 
from child support in the context of abortion). 
 42. See Marshall B. Kapp, The Father’s (Lack of) Right and Responsibilities 
in the Abortion Decision: An Examination of Legal–Ethical Implications, 9 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 369, 381 (1982) (arguing that Roe “reduced the father of a fetus to 
the status of a helpless bystander,” and, consequentially, he should not be held 
responsible for child support).  
 43. Infra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
 44. Infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.  
 45. See Kapp, supra note 42, at 378–79 (“Where a man is forced to 
discharge support obligations toward a child whom he did not anticipate or want 
and over whose birth or personhood he had no control or responsibility, he may 
justly claim discrimination.”). Shortly after Roe, the Alabama Supreme Court 
rejected an equal protection claim against the paternity obligation of a man who 
had offered to pay for an(other) abortion for his pregnant girlfriend when she 
declined and later sued him for child support. See Harris v. State, 356 So. 2d 
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universally rejected this equal protection argument, resulting in 
this theory having no authority and little actual impact upon 
family law regulation.46 It has, however, had some impact 
informally in court as demonstrated by the mere fact that courts 
have often been confronted with this argument.47 Although the 
argument might make a modicum of sense logically, it would be a 
family law defeat to see fathers escape their obligations to their 
born children.48 What are not certain are the effects on children 
and their relationship with their parent once this argument has 
been made in court and the child becomes aware of it. It would be 
detrimental in several ways to children everywhere were fathers 
relieved of their obligations to their children.49 
                                                                                                     
623, 624 (Ala. 1978) (rejecting the father’s equal protection argument to deny 
any liability for the child). Harris, the father, contended that Alabama’s 
paternity determination proceeding statutes “deny the father of an illegitimate 
child equal protection of the laws.” Id. He argued that because Mary, the 
mother, “did not consent to have an abortion when he requested her to do so,” 
and because he agreed to pay for the abortion, he was “denied any decision as to 
the birth of the child,” making him “not liable for the child’s maintenance, care 
and education.” Id. The court held that the “decision not to have an abortion was 
that of Mary Moore, and hers alone, and by not having one at the request of 
Harris, Harris cannot now shirk his obligations to the child as required by the 
statute.” Id. (concluding, based on Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, that there 
were no “constitutional infirmities” in the paternity statutes and that a state 
cannot give a husband a “veto” over his wife’s decision to have an abortion). The 
premise of whether intent (to become a parent) is relevant for child support 
obligations has come about because of Roe. This is because the law since Roe 
allows mothers to eliminate the obligation (child), while not allowing that same 
ability to fathers. 
 46. See Morgan, supra note 41, at 371 (“Courts have been unwilling to 
accept an argument that the constitutional rights that a woman enjoys to 
terminate a pregnancy also give men the right not to procreate.”).  
 47. See id. at 371 n.30 (compiling cases from six states in which fathers 
attempted to argue equal protection claims based on a woman’s refusal to have 
an abortion). 
 48. Some suggest that the law is logically unequal in this area. “[I]f 
women’s partial responsibility for pregnancy does not obligate them to support a 
fetus, then men’s partial responsibility for pregnancy does not obligate them to 
support a resulting child.” Elizabeth Brake, Fatherhood and Child Support: Do 
Men Have a Right to Choose?, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 55, 56 (2005) (arguing that at 
most, men should be responsible for helping with the medical expenses and 
other costs of a pregnancy for which they are partly responsible). 
 49. See Sheldon, supra note 41, at 188 (suggesting that, as a consequence of 
relieving fathers of their obligations to their children, “[m]en would be 
encouraged to become less involved in their families; abortion of potentially 
wanted children would be encouraged; gendered [sic] disparities in wealth would 
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Second, a child’s relationship with a father as expressed 
through child support has been directly affected by Roe and its 
progeny through the emergence of fraud and misrepresentation 
arguments that arise as an extension of the significance Roe 
implicitly attaches to the intent to become a parent. As described 
by Melanie McCulley: 
[P]utative fathers also have employed the claim or defense of 
fraud and misrepresentation in paternity proceedings to avoid 
their duty to pay support or to recover from the female 
damages for the amount of the support awarded. The putative 
father argues that the mother lied to him regarding her ability 
to conceive or her use of contraceptives. Thus, the putative 
father could not have agreed to become a father and should not 
be made to pay support or should be allowed to recover 
damages because his right to procreative choice or his right to 
privacy has been violated.50 
Courts unanimously have held that such claims or defenses are 
against public policy.51 Whether or not this is fairness, or 
equality, or good public policy is a matter of debate.52 Moreover, 
                                                                                                     
be further entrenched; and child poverty would be exacerbated”). These points 
are made not to argue that fathers should have the unilateral decision for an 
abortion. Rather, they are made to draw out the concerns that are derived from 
Roe with regard to fatherhood. Indeed, children today are affected by 
fatherlessness. See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: 
CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 25–48 (1995) (summarizing 
the impacts of fatherlessness, including its effect on youth violence, domestic 
violence against women, child sex abuse, child poverty, and economic 
insecurity). Whether the growing social problem of fatherlessness is connected 
to Roe is a worthwhile discussion, but beyond the scope of this Article. 
 50. Melanie G. McCulley, The Male Abortion: The Putative Father’s Right 
to Terminate His Interests in and Obligations to the Unborn Child, 7 J.L. & 
POL’Y 1, 23 (1998). 
 51. See Jill E. Evans, In Search of Paternal Equality: A Father’s Right to 
Pursue a Claim of Paternal Misrepresentation, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045, 1065–
92 (2005) (compiling dozens of cases in support of the proposition that 
misrepresentation claims, made in any form, have been “singularly 
unsuccessful”). 
 52. Compare Erika M. Hiester, Child Support Statutes and the Father’s 
Right Not to Procreate, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 213, 241 (2004) (affording a 
statutory overview and concluding that “[i]t is inequitable and unjust to force 
responsibility on [a father] for the choices made by the mother of his child”), and 
McCulley, supra note 50, at 56 (maintaining that “courts have erred in 
systematically denying the putative father’s rights and in focusing their 
analysis on the financial best interests of the child”), with Evans, supra note 51, 
at 1108–09 (claiming that Griswold and Eisenstadt create an individual right to 
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the desire by a father that his child be aborted is not harmless. 
Children are inevitably impacted by the knowledge that their 
parents did not want them.53 
These instances reveal how the parent–child relationship is 
harmed by nonsupport of the child by the parent. The question of 
whether intent to become a parent is relevant for child support 
obligations has become salient because of Roe.54 Roe granted 
mothers an opportunity to eliminate the obligation to support 
children they have conceived, and it prompted fathers to fight for 
a comparable opportunity. The parent–child relationship is thus 
harmed by nonsupport of the child by the parent. Whether the 
pro-life movement, as one response to Roe, has supported efforts 
to improve the collection of support payments from fathers as a 
way to combat abortion by alleviating the financial pressure upon 
women with unwanted pregnancies is a worthwhile question. 
Despite some recent changes, the various devices for collecting 
support payments are still woefully inadequate.55 
                                                                                                     
procreate and, as a corollary, a “nondelegable obligation to protect against 
unwanted procreation,” which justifies courts in rejecting fraud and 
misrepresentation claims), and Andrea M. Sharrin, Potential Fathers and 
Abortion: A Woman’s Womb Is Not a Man’s Castle, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1359, 1404 
(1990) (emphasizing the autonomy differences between men and women in 
reproductive choice and concluding that these differences do not provide a 
“convincing basis for the creation of paternal rights that would operate to the 
exclusion of the right to an abortion”). 
 53. Cf. Henry P. David, Born Unwanted, 35 Years Later: the Prague Study, 
REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, May 2006, at 181, 187 (studying 350 mothers who 
did not want their children, noting that “in the aggregate, being born from an 
unwanted pregnancy entails an increased risk for negative psychosocial 
development and mental well-being (at least up to age 35, the end of the 
study)”). The author further noted that when tested against a control group, 
“the findings . . . lend at least partial support to the hypothesis that being born 
from an unwanted pregnancy has longer-term negative effects” because “[t]he 
unwanted pregnancy subjects became psychiatric patients (especially in-
patients) more often than controls born from accepted pregnancies and also 
more often than their older siblings.” Id. 
 54. Melanie B. Jacobs, Intentional Parenthood’s Influence: Rethinking 
Procreative Autonomy and Federal Paternity Establishment Policy, 20 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 489, 492 (2012) (“Inherent within the definition of 
procreative liberty that embraces the freedom to have children or not [derived 
from Roe] is the concept of intent . . . .”). 
 55. See Paula G. Roberts, Child Support Orders: Problems With 
Enforcement, 4 CHILD. & DIVORCE 101, 103 (1994) (discussing low child support 
collection). 
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Roe has also had an impact on the parent–child relationship 
with respect to adoption law. Increased abortion choices have 
naturally shrunk the pool of newborn children available for 
adoption.56 In considering the impact of Roe, it is helpful to bear 
in mind not just what impact Roe has actually had but what 
impact it should have had in the area of adoption law. With fewer 
newborns needing an adoption placement, state services have 
generally not worked to simplify and lessen the expenses of 
adoption procedures.57  
Another piece to this abortion–adoption puzzle has been the 
rise of Safe Haven (or safe harbor) laws,58 in which states have 
                                                                                                     
 56. See Marianne Bitler & Madeline Zavodny, Did Abortion Legalization 
Reduce the Number of Unwanted Children? Evidence from Adoptions, 34 PERSP. 
ON SEXUALITY & REPROD. HEALTH 25, 25 (2002), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3402502.html (showing a sizable effect 
of abortion on the decline in adoption rates, particularly revealing that abortion 
legalization led to a reduction of “unwanted” children and of children available 
for adoption). 
 57. See generally Erika Lynn Kleiman, Caring for Our Own: Why American 
Adoption Law and Policy Must Change, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 327 (1997) 
(discussing the problem of adoption law complexity in several contexts). 
 58. Safe Haven laws are found in every state and in the District of 
Columbia. ALA. CODE §§ 26-25-1 to -5 (2013); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.013, .990 
(2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623.01 (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-34-201, -
202 (2013); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.7 (West 2013); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 271.5 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304.5 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 17a-57, -58 (2012); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 902, 907–08 (2013); D.C. CODE 
§§ 4-1451.01 to .08 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 383.50 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-10A-
2 to -7 (2013); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 587D-1 to -7 (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§§ 39-8201 to -8207 (2013); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2/10, 2/15, 2/20, 2/27 (2013); 
IND. CODE § 31-34-2.5-1 (2013); IOWA CODE §§ 233.1, .2 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38-2282 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 216B.190, 405.075 (LexisNexis 2013); 
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 1149–53 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tits. 17-A, § 553, 22 
§ 4018 (2013); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-641 (LexisNexis 2013); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39 1/2 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 712.1, .2, .3, .5, 
.20 (2013); MINN. STAT. §§ 145.902, 260C.139, 609.3785 (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§§ 43-15-201, -203, -207, -209 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.950 (2013); MONT. 
CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-402 to -405 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-121 (2012); NEV. 
REV. STAT. §§ 432B.160, .630 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 132-A:1 to :4 
(2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-15.6 to -15.10 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 24-22-1.1, -2, -3, -8 (2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 260.00, .10 (McKinney 2013); 
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 372-g (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-500 (2012); 
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-02, 50-25.1-15 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 2151.3515, .3516, .3523 (LexisNexis 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-2-109 
(2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.017 (2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4306, 6502, 6504, 
6507 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-13.1-2, -3 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-40 
(2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-5A-27, -31, -34 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-
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approved statutes that allow babies to be abandoned in specific 
locations if certain procedures are followed.59 Safe Haven laws 
allow newborn babies to be abandoned at fire stations, doctors’ 
offices, and hospitals, without charging the abandoning parent 
with any potential criminal liability for negligence or abuse.60 
Rather than encourage a parent to place his or her child up for 
adoption, Safe Haven laws provided a way for a parent to be 
released from responsibility for his or her child, while 
encouraging the protection of the child’s safety.61 Safe Haven 
laws were also used as a political tool to discourage abortion, 
given that they provided another option for women handling 
unwanted pregnancies.62 Though not directly the reason for the 
                                                                                                     
1-142, 68-11-255 (2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 262.301, .302 (West 2013); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-4a-801, -802 (LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 1303 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-226.5:2, 18.2-371.1, 40.1-103 (2013); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 13.34.360 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 49-6E-1 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 48.195 
(2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-11-101, -102, -103, –108 (2013). 
 59. Texas was the first state with such a law, named the “Baby Moses 
Law,” in 1998; by 2008 all fifty states had some sort of safe haven type of law. 
See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INFANT 
SAFE HAVEN LAW 1–2 (2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_ 
policies/statutes/safehaven.pdf (outlining the widespread adoption of safe haven 
laws by all fifty states).  
 60. See Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of 
Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 753 (2006) (laying out how these laws relate to 
pro-life political objectives). 
 61. See Susan Ayres, Kairos and Safe Havens: The Timing and Calamity of 
Unwanted Birth, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 227, 227, 249, 278–79, 281 
(2008) (noting that states passed these laws “in an effort to stem the problem of 
neonaticide and illegal abandonment,” which could number into the hundreds 
each year). 
 62. See Sanger, supra note 60, at 753 (arguing that, by enacting Safe 
Haven laws, states are working to promote a “culture of life” that seeks the 
ultimate reversal of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). From the indications 
given in some commentary and based on some state experiences with the law, 
Safe Haven laws arose to stem the rising tide of infanticide. See id. at 774–75 
(describing the string of infanticides that were used to advance legislation in 
various states); see also Lynne Marie Kohm & Thomas Scott Liverman, Prom 
Mom Killers: The Impact of Blame Shift and Distorted Statistics on Punishment 
for Neonaticide, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 43, 56, 70–71 (2002) (citing 
evidence indicating that “child homicide and infanticide rates continue to rise in 
the United States,” and asserting that states have responded to this trend by 
passing Safe Haven laws). Consider, for example, the experience in Nebraska, 
where lawmakers neglected at first to insert into the law an age limit for the 
surrendered child and found their state becoming a haven for troubled parents 
to drop off their teen children. See Ed Lavandera, Nebraska Fears Rush to Drop 
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development of Safe Haven laws, Roe’s jurisprudence may have 
heightened the urgency of the underlying rationale that states 
were worried about mothers killing newborn babies, as indicated 
by the introduction of similar laws in France.63 
Individuals from all political and legal views seem to agree 
that Safe Haven laws are at least partly supported by political 
ideology flowing from Roe v. Wade.64 These views fall into three 
main areas. First, some think that Safe Haven laws are a result 
of the “culture of life” movement that erupted after Roe.65 This 
view proposes that Roe v. Wade has created a society that is 
dismissive of the importance of life and asserts that Safe Haven 
laws are considered part of the general “culture of life” movement 
as an effort to guard children who may otherwise be dismissively 
disposed of because of this culture.66 Second, some think that 
                                                                                                     
Off Kids Before Haven Law Change, CNN (Nov. 8, 2008, 11:38 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/11/14/nebraska.safe.haven/ (last visited Jan. 6, 
2014) (“Safe haven laws were meant to protect infants . . . . Safe haven laws 
allow distraught parents, who fear that their children are in imminent danger, 
to drop them off at hospitals without being charged with abandonment.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The connection between this 
rationale and Roe may be tenuous, but it could be argued that Roe has devalued 
the worth of a child, making a child more vulnerable to maltreatment, leading to 
the initial conception of Safe Haven-type laws. This view is worth further 
development but is essentially beyond the scope of this Article and its focus on 
family law.  
 63. See Nadine Lefaucheur, The French “Tradition” of Anonymous Birth: 
The Lines of Argument, 18 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 319, 321, 329–30 (2004) 
(explaining the French perception of their form of anonymous abandonment 
laws as “saving children,” as these laws were designed to give women another 
option besides abortion for unwanted pregnancies). But cf. Susan Ayres, Not a 
Story to Pass On: Constructing Mothers Who Kill, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 39 
(2004) (considering whether legalized abandonment solves the problem of 
neonaticide and newborn abandonment). It should be noted that the fact that 
France acted to pass laws to limit infanticide because of concerns about abortion 
does not necessarily mean, however, that American states did the same. 
 64. See Sanger, supra note 60, at 759 (noting that Safe Haven laws are 
supported by the political rhetoric surrounding the abortion debate with broad 
“coalitions of unusual bedfellows”).  
 65. See id. at 753 (arguing that Safe Haven laws are properly understood 
within a larger political “culture of life” organized around “the protection of 
unborn life,” and that Safe Haven laws ultimately work to promote the reversal 
of Roe by “connecting infant life to unborn life and infanticide to abortion”).  
 66. See id. at 808 (“Safe Haven legislation serves as one more connecting 
dot in a larger enterprise that seeks to blur the boundaries between prenatal 
and postnatal life, contributing powerfully to the pro-life project by keeping 
what is characterized as the murderousness of abortion in the public eye.”). 
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these laws are an extension of the idea of reproductive rights for 
women and hail Safe Haven laws as an additional way for 
mothers to maintain privacy a result of Roe.67 This means that 
rather than adopting the view that Safe Haven laws’ primary 
rhetorical impact is reversing Roe v. Wade, they are “providing 
women with another choice in their continuum of decision-
making for unwanted pregnancies.”68 Third, some argue in an 
interesting and distinct way that Roe has created a pro-women’s 
rights atmosphere in Safe Haven laws that is too expansive, 
cutting biological fathers out of the equation after birth; arguing 
that Safe Haven laws disrespect paternal rights in a way Roe 
never intended:  
The rationale in Roe suggests that what happens to a child 
once born cannot be subject to exclusive maternal control. 
While potential fathers cannot participate much in decisions 
on prenatal care, nor on pregnancy termination, a father can 
fully participate in childrearing once a child is born. In fact, 
under prevailing public policies, a father typically merits an 
equal opportunity to rear children, such that unilateral 
decision making by a mother cannot be tolerated.69 
More saliently, Safe Haven laws are advanced with the 
political rhetoric of Roe in the context of parents being relieved of 
obligations to their children, something that traditionally occurs 
in the context of adoption placement. As part of a domestic 
                                                                                                     
 67. See Brittany Neal, Reforming the Safe Haven in Ohio: Protecting the 
Rights of Mothers Through Anonymity, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 347, 370 (2012) (“Much 
like Roe protects the right to have an abortion, a woman’s right to safely 
surrender her baby to medical experts, without another individual interfering 
with her decision, is crucial in a woman maintaining her due process right to 
privacy.”). 
 68. Ayres, supra note 61, at 278. 
 69. Jeffrey A. Parness & Therese A. Clarke Arado, Safe Haven, Adoption 
and Birth Record Laws: Where Are the Daddies? 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 207, 235–236 
(2007); see also Jeffrey A. Parness, Deserting Mothers, Abandoned Babies, Lost 
Fathers: Dangers in Safe Havens, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 335, 347 (2006) 
Yet, notwithstanding their pre-birth abortion rights under Roe v. 
Wade, women have never generally possessed veto powers over the 
childrearing interests of genetic fathers of children born alive, at least 
where the women are unwed genetic mothers whose pregnancies 
resulted from consensual sexual intercourse. Such maternal powers 
are “foreign to our legal tradition.” 
(citation omitted). 
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relations regulatory system, Roe has assisted in the addition of 
new laws that have affected the parent–child relationship. 
Roe’s influence has also stretched into other laws that 
negatively impact the parent–child relationship. The value of a 
child, not from an economic standpoint but from an intrinsic 
standpoint, is reflected in a proliferation of litigation over the tort 
of wrongful birth. Consider “medical malpractice claim[s] brought 
when a physician’s negligent care leads to the birth of a child 
with a congenital illness or abnormality that the parents would 
have chosen to abort had they been given appropriate prenatal 
counseling and information earlier in the pregnancy.”70 Because 
the “result of genetic testing may lead a woman to terminate her 
pregnancy,” these tests open “a flood of moral and philosophical 
issues.”71 To prevail in a wrongful birth claim, parents must 
establish that they have been harmed by the birth of their child, 
an element which is “likely the most controversial and 
philosophically difficult aspect of the wrongful birth action.”72 
Rare before Roe, abortion protection has led indirectly to a 
proliferation of this litigation.73  
The wrongful birth tort action is lauded by pro-choice 
advocates on the basis that it “ensures that doctors will exercise 
due care in prenatal counseling and provide parents with the 
information necessary to make informed procreative decisions,” 
particularly toward abortion.74 Some states, however, notably 
those that have gravitated toward increased abortion regulation 
                                                                                                     
 70. Julie Gantz, State Statutory Preclusion of Wrongful Birth Relief: A 
Troubling Re-Writing of a Woman’s Right to Choose and the Doctor–Patient 
Relationship, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 795, 796 (1997) (discussing the 
circumstances of residents of Pennsylvania, “one of six states whose legislature 
has determined that women have no cause of action against their doctors if, but 
for the lack of correct genetic information, they would have chosen abortion 
rather than continue the pregnancy”). 
 71. Id. at 808. 
 72. Id. at 815 (“There are two views on what constitutes harm: 1. the 
absence of choice in reproductive decisions; and 2. the birth of an impaired 
child.”). 
 73. See Amy Lynn Sorrel, Judging Genetic Risks: Physicians Often Caught 
Between What Patients Want and What Science Offers, AM. MED. NEWS (Nov. 10, 
2008), http://www.amednews.com/article/20081110/profession/311109973/4 (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2014) (noting that “case law in about 25 states recognizes 
wrongful birth claims”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 74. Gantz, supra note 70, at 806. 
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and greater protection for fetal life, have passed legislation to 
prohibit wrongful birth actions.75 Other states have protected 
fetal life in their case law, as in Hamilton v. Scott,76 in which the 
Supreme Court of Alabama reaffirmed “that the lives of unborn 
children are protected by Alabama’s wrongful-death statue, 
regardless of viability.”77 It makes sense that support for the 
wrongful birth tort tracks with support for abortion, for the action 
adopts a pro-choice or pro-abortion view of the unborn child, 
dependent on recognition that a mother’s autonomy absolutely 
overrides any rights of the child regardless of its moral status.78 
Of course, as a legal remedy, the wrongful birth action not only 
depends on a pro-choice rationale but it is also impacted by Roe’s 
holding, as without abortion as a legal and justifiable option, the 
tort would be impossible. Wrongful birth has led to depreciation 
of the parent–child relationship and of children.79 
                                                                                                     
 75. See Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the Double Helix: Malpractice Liability 
for Failure to Warn of Genetic Risk, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 149, 159–60 (1992) (noting 
that these states banned the cause of action because they were persuaded that 
prenatal diagnosis of genetic conditions “encourages abortion”); Gantz, supra 
note 70, at 818–19 (noting that wrongful birth actions are explicitly barred by 
statute in several states—Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, and Utah—and implicitly barred in North Carolina by a conscience 
clause that the state supreme court has interpreted to preclude the legal theory 
of wrongful birth). 
 76. 97 So. 3d 728 (Ala. 2012) (maintaining a wrongful death action for the 
death of an unborn child who died before he was viable). 
 77. Id. at 737 (Parker, J., concurring specially). Justice Thomas Parker’s 
special concurrence in this case set forth why Roe v. Wade did not bar the result 
the court reached as Roe is not controlling authority beyond abortion law, 
emphasizing “the diminishing influence of Roe’s viability standard.” Id. 
 78. See Gantz, supra note 70, at 808–09 (stating that a “wrongful birth 
action recognizes a woman’s right to choose abortion and compensates her when 
that liberty is denied by the act or omission of a doctor failing to meet the 
standard of care” (citation omitted)). Gantz argues that “[w]rongful birth 
liability protects women from pro-life doctors imposing their own moral views on 
their patients.” Id. Gantz also offers some interesting comments on how Roe has 
affected other areas of society, to the point of suggesting that pro-life OB/GYNs 
are in the wrong profession. See id. at 810 (noting that such doctors are “quite 
possibly in the wrong specialty”). Freedom of conscience for the medical 
professional is nearly nonexistent in that “[w]ith the wrongful birth action 
available, the pro-life obstetrician has no legal choice but to put aside his 
personal views and provide his patients with the information they need to 
decide whether to undergo genetic screening.” Id. at 811. 
 79. See Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and 
Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 176 (2005) (focusing on 
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In great contrast to the tort of wrongful birth is the 
development in criminal law of fetal homicide laws. Laws 
criminalizing intentional or negligent harm to fetal life have 
continued to develop post-Roe.80 Legislation designed to punish 
violence against pregnant women, protect unborn life, and to 
punish its taking was stimulated, at least somewhat, by the lack 
of protection for unborn life brought about under Roe.81 Roe 
created an obstacle that barred the states from protecting fetal 
life, as states would have done (and indeed did do) without Roe.82 
Fetal homicide laws became an avenue of state protection of 
unborn life as a consequence of Roe.83  
Finally, consider what message a government sends to its 
citizens about the value of a child when it endorses, as a 
fundamental right, a parent’s choice to kill a child, albeit unborn. 
The very person a child is most dependent upon prior to birth and 
for a good many of the first years of life is also the one by which 
he or she can be placed in the most jeopardy. The Supreme Court 
in 1973, even if unwittingly, severely devalued children generally, 
and by their closest relatives specifically, with its ruling in Roe. 
                                                                                                     
how the tort devalues disabilities and the unborn children that are challenged 
with them). 
 80. See Jennifer A. Brobst, The Prospect of Enacting an Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act in North Carolina, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 127, 140 (2006) (offering that, 
in the aftermath of Roe, “a majority of jurisdictions, both state and federal, have 
now successfully enacted and sustained fetal homicide laws”). See generally 
Mark S. Kende, Michigan's Proposed Prenatal Protection Act: Undermining a 
Woman’s Right to an Abortion, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 247 (1996) (examining 
Michigan’s Senate Bill 515, which criminalizes “virtually any injury to a fetus” 
without regard to intent but which provides a “medical exception” designed to 
comport with Roe and Casey, as an attempt to limit abortion rights). 
 81. See Luke M. Milligan, A Theory of Stability: John Rawls, Fetal 
Homicide, and Substantive Due Process, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1188–92 (2007) 
(discussing the juxtaposition that Roe created, the inquiries prompted by fetal-
homicide laws, and a mother’s exemption from them). 
 82. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 16, at 78 (describing the laws struck down 
by the Court in Roe). 
 83. See Michael Holzapfel, The Right to Live, The Right to Choose, and the 
Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 431, 439 
(2002) (“According to Planned Parenthood, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act is 
designed solely with the intent of eroding the very foundation of Roe v. Wade.”). 
But see Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws, 
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 723–24 (2006) (supporting the notion that fetal homicide 
laws have passed as a result of Roe, but that those “laws are not uniformly 
hostile to the landmark decision”). 
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These areas of the mature minor doctrine,84 child support 
disputes,85 safe haven laws,86 wrongful birth tort actions,87 and 
fetal homicide laws all work to reveal a landscape of laws that 
owe their development to Roe. These areas of legislation have 
affected and harmed the parent–child relationship and the value 
of the child in the four decades since the decision. 
III. Roe’s Effects on Marriage and the Spousal Relationship 
Roe disallowed many state and federal restrictions on 
abortion throughout the United States.88 Its holding was 
reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey, which became the source of invalidating spousal 
notification requirements.89 States like Pennsylvania began to 
work post-Roe to protect the welfare of citizens in light of the 
legality of abortion by developing various statutory parameters 
for the exercise of that right within the Roe framework.90 The 
Justices in Casey were tasked with reviewing the 
constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s regulations on abortion;91 they 
determined that the only unconstitutional portion in the law was 
that of spousal involvement in a woman’s right to an abortion.92 
                                                                                                     
 84. Supra notes 25–40 and accompanying text. 
 85. Supra notes 41–55 and accompanying text. 
 86. Supra notes 56–69 and accompanying text. 
 87. Supra notes 70–79 and accompanying text. 
 88. See William Mears & Bob Franken, 30 Years After Ruling, Ambiguity, 
Anxiety Surround Abortion Debate, CNN (Jan. 22, 2003, 2:53 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/21/roevwade.overview/ (last visited Jan. 14, 
2014) (reporting that Roe and its companion case “impacted laws in 46 states”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 89. See 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (saying Pennsylvania’s spousal notification 
was “an undue burden, and therefore invalid”). 
 90. See id. at 946–50 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing various state 
regulations implemented after Roe). 
 91. See id. at 844 (plurality opinion) (describing the provisions of the 
Pennsylvania law at issue). 
 92. See id. at 880, 895 (concluding, respectively, that Pennsylvania’s 
definition of medical emergency did not violate Roe, and that the spousal 
notification requirement constituted an unconstitutional undue burden). See 
generally Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the 
New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 77–83 
(1995) (describing Casey’s path to the Court, its holdings, and public reaction to 
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The marital relationship was altered when the Court ruled that 
there could be no requirement of spousal notification of 
abortion.93 Rather than promoting marital harmony, the Court 
pushed a wedge between the husband and the wife. The Court 
raised the issue of disharmony in the marital relationship as 
justification for seeking an abortion, as a reason a woman would 
be unable to discuss the matter with her husband, but also 
effectively thwarted any right of the husband to communicate 
with his wife on the matter of the unborn child or of the 
marriage.94 The autonomy set out in Roe served as spousal 
distancing in Casey.  
Marital communication has historically been important to 
the Supreme Court of the United States.95 It rendered the 
common law doctrine of marital privilege regarding confidential 
communications between spouses constitutional.96 Reflecting the 
significance traditionally ascribed to marital communications, 
even in the years since Roe when spousal notification 
requirements were outlawed,97 ten states still carry on their 
books unenforceable laws requiring spousal consent or notice.98  
                                                                                                     
it). 
 93. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (ruling that Pennsylvania’s spousal 
notification law was an undue burden). 
 94. See id. at 892 (discussing studies that found “marital difficulties” to be 
“the primary reason women do not notify their husbands” when the husband is 
the father). The Court noted that a strong marriage would not need a spousal 
notification law, as spouses would certainly discuss important decisions such as 
that of abortion. Id. at 892–93. Rather, the Court focused on the need for 
freedom from spousal notice or consent in marriages characterized by abuse or 
cruelty. Id. at 893. 
 95. See, e.g., Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (recognizing that 
confidential communications between spouses are privileged for evidentiary 
purposes); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 222–23 (1839) (outlining the doctrine 
of the marital communications privilege). 
 96. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (recognizing the 
existence of a federal evidentiary privilege for confidential communications 
between spouses). 
 97. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) 
(striking down Pennsylvania’s spousal notification law). 
 98. See MSU State Abortion Law Survey, supra note 35 (listing Colorado, 
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, and Utah as retaining spousal notification laws). 
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Lack of communication is often cited as a primary source of 
marital breakdown and subsequent dissolution.99 What role Roe 
has had in the proliferation of divorce is a more complex matter. 
Divorce prior to the late 1960s was generally available for causes 
of action based on fault by one of the parties.100 The fault of the 
perpetrating spouse was considered a breach of the marital 
promise or agreement, and thus victim spouses could sue for 
divorce based on the damage caused by the other spouse’s fault.101 
Many states also had bilateral no-fault divorce laws based on the 
married parties’ consent to living separate and apart for a 
lengthy period of time.102 In the early 1970s, however, divorce 
laws in many states began to change with a nation-wide sweep 
toward no-fault divorce, a phenomenon that is commonly called 
the divorce revolution.103 The proliferation of no-fault divorce 
laws provided for unilateral action and occurred largely after 
1972, correlating chronologically with the Roe decision.104 The 
                                                                                                     
 99. See Ailsa Burns, Perceived Causes of Marriage Breakdown and 
Conditions of Life, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 551, 553 (1984) (finding that lack of 
communication was the second most frequently reported reason for marital 
breakdown). 
 100. See Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 
1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 83 (identifying pre-1969 divorce grounds on the basis of 
fault). 
 101. See id. at 86 (discussing the idea of fault as “breach of marital trust”). 
 102. See William E. McCurdy, Divorce—A Suggested Approach, 9 VAND. L. 
REV. 685, 701 (1956) (describing the state of divorce laws from the nineteenth 
century through the 1950s). 
 103. See, e.g., LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE 
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN 
AMERICA 20–51 (1985) (describing the trend toward no-fault divorce in the 
1970s). 
 104. See Wardle, supra note 100, at 97, 137 n.220 (citing to the research of 
Doris Jonas Freed and her many articles on the development of divorce grounds 
in the fifty states). In 1969, eight states had no-fault grounds for divorce. Id. at 
138. That number rose to thirty-three in 1973 and forty-three in 1977. Id. By 
1987, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had adopted some form of no-
fault divorce. Id. For an overview of each state’s code on divorce, including no-
fault grounds, see Grounds for Divorce and Residency Requirements, 46 FAMILY 
L.Q. 530, 530–533 fig.4 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/family_law_quarterly/vol46/4win13_chart4_divorce.authcheckdam.
pdf (providing that all fifty states, including the District of Columbia, have 
adopted some form of no-fault divorce). See also generally Denese Ashbaugh 
Vlosly & Pamela A. Monroe, The Effective Dates of No-Fault Divorce Laws in the 
50 States, Families and the Law, 51 FAM. REL. 317, 317−24, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3700329.  
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increase in divorce rates among the American population also 
correlates chronologically with Roe, but is generally thought to be 
more connected to the no-fault divorce revolution when the 
American divorce rate more than doubled.105 A reasonable 
inference could be made that disagreements between husbands 
and wives as to whether accessing the right to an abortion could 
be either a part or a whole reason for some divorces, but a causal 
connection cannot be clearly established.  
Comparisons between abortion rights and divorce 
opportunities, however, are instructive here. Professor Mary Ann 
Glendon’s comparative law work in abortion regulation and 
divorce law observes that abortion has been less regulated in the 
United States than anywhere in the western world, while at the 
same time divorce laws among the states have been “less 
diligent . . . to mitigate the economic casualties of divorce” to 
family members comparatively than have other western 
nations.106 She seems to attribute these connections to special 
American traits, or factors that might have facilitated a uniquely 
American approach to divorce and abortion.107 Professor Glendon 
summarizes her assertions in that “political and legal ideas have 
played no small part in forming the distinctively American way of 
imagining the individual in his or her relationships to others in 
the family and larger communities.”108 Similarly, Professor Helen 
Alvaré discusses the notion of a more egocentric, adult-centered 
approach to marriage that “view[s] marriage as more of a self-
seeking than a self-giving institution, and thus steer[s] marriage 
and families in a direction precisely opposite that which is needed 
                                                                                                     
 105. See Stéphane Mechoulan, Divorce Laws and the Structure of the 
American Family, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 165 (2006) (offering an empirical look 
at the impact of no-fault divorce laws on marriage and divorce in America). See 
generally Gruber, supra note 3. 
 106. See GLENDON, supra note 7, at 2, ch. 2 (discussing these phenomena 
and the restrictions placed on divorce in other western nations). 
 107. See id. at ch. 3 (discussing an individual rights approach that 
dominates American legal thinking with marital breakdown potentially working 
to disadvantage the family unit left impoverished by divorce). Professor 
Catharine MacKinnon also analyzes the privacy basis of abortion as an 
individual right in American jurisprudence. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
Privacy vs. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93, 102 (1987). Professor MacKinnon’s analysis is 
most relevant to and discussed further infra Part IV. 
 108. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 7. 
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to reconnect these institutions to children and to the larger 
society.”109 Considering the resulting effects of this individual 
focus on marriage with the insight that Professors Glendon and 
Alvaré offer is significant. The movement toward individualism 
can be perceived in the embargo of spousal notice in abortion 
through the way it affects marital oneness and communication. 
Though abortion availability without spousal notice may not be a 
direct cause of increased divorce rates, an argument can be made 
regarding the individual liberty interests common to both 
opportunities of abortion and divorce.110 The autonomy fostered 
by abortion rights in privacy and choice to one marriage partner 
unilaterally creates a wedge in the notion of marital oneness.111 
That separation serves to weaken the marital bond. Roe opened 
up options that altered how couples deal with the choice to 
become a parent. They do not have to face abortion together; 
parental choice to abort a child rests with one individual, a fact 
                                                                                                     
 109. Helen M. Alvaré, The Turn Toward the Self in the Law of Marriage & 
Family: Same-Sex Marriage & Its Predecessors, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 
136 (2005). Professor Alvaré makes this point even more clearly in the larger 
context of family law:  
[M]arriage is not a tool for adults to feel better about being different, 
but an important element to express state interests in the well-being 
of children. Parents’ interests are not unimportant; marital happiness 
is a terribly important component of adult happiness. Yet in the eyes 
and on the scales of the law, the state is more vigorously protective of 
children’s interests and looks to strong marital unions as the way of 
assuring these. This is why the state can interfere with parents in 
cases of child abuse, why divorcing parties may never have the last 
word about child support or custody, why adoption procedures attend 
so much more closely to the interests of the child than even the 
deepest longings of would-be parents, and why recent federal and 
state lawmaking efforts about marriage, divorce, and welfare all have 
children as their rallying cry. 
Id. at 187. 
 110. Others have connected abortion and divorce before with liberty 
jurisprudence and family outcomes. See generally, e.g., JENNIFER E. SPRENG, 
ABORTION AND DIVORCE LAW IN IRELAND (2004) (examining the history of both 
laws in Ireland and their connections to community and family dynamics). 
 111. Professor Bruce C. Hafen examines the dynamics of abortion (and 
contraception) in the context of marriage in his article, The Constitutional 
Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and 
Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 527−38 (1983) (discussing the competing 
interests of each in family law). 
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that is not conducive to marital unity.112 This works to expand 
the wedge into marital oneness. Combined with the unilateral 
choice to dissolve marriage, the unilateral nature of abortion has 
the potential to severely weaken the moral fiber of marriage, 
which might thereby increase the possibility of divorce.113  
Marriage has also been altered by the concept of privacy as 
developed through case law, including Roe. Efforts toward 
expanding marriage’s definition and the type of unions afforded 
state recognition have been altered in that rather than 
recognizing conjugal114 marriage alone, several states have moved 
to expand marriage toward non-conjugal variations.115 The most 
                                                                                                     
 112. On the other hand, some might suggest that an abortion could promote 
marriage, as was the case with one high-profile couple. While not wishing to 
promote abortion, a joint decision for abortion between cohabitants led to 
marriage for NBA player Udonis Haslem and Faith Rein. See Linda Marx, 
Taking Their Very Sweet Time, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2013), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/fashion/weddings/taking-their-very-sweet-time.ht 
ml (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (describing Rein’s decision to get an abortion as a 
positive turning point in their relationship) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). But compare that to NBA star J.J. Redick, who contracted 
with his girlfriend for an abortion. See Barry Petchesky, How J.J. Redick’s 
Abortion Contract Was Conceived, DEADSPIN (Jul. 25, 2013, 4:20 PM), 
http://deadspin.com/how-j-j-redicks-abortion-contract-was-conceived-9127 27291 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (detailing an agreement between Redick and his 
girlfriend that was premised on her getting an abortion) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 113. For a clinical look at the effect of abortion on troubled marriages, see 
generally J. Mattison, The Effects of Abortion on Marriage, in ABORTION: 
MEDICAL PROGRESS AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS, CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM 115 
(1985) (examining clinical aspects of an abortion’s effects on the marriage 
partners and on their marriage in the context of couples turning to therapy who 
find they may not have understood at the time of the abortion the effects it 
would have on them and their marriage later). 
 114. “Conjugal” defines those rights shared specifically by a wife and a 
husband, and include the enjoyment of each other’s society, intimacy, comfort, 
and affections, also generally referring to sexual intimacy between a married 
man and woman. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (9th ed. 2009) (“Of or 
relating to the married state, often with an implied emphasis on sexual 
relations between spouses . . . .”). The term is used as a primary indicator of 
marriage by Girgis, Anderson, and George to describe a marriage of a man and a 
woman as contrasted to a same-sex marriage. See SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. 
ANDERSON & ROBERT P. GEORGE, WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A 
DEFENSE 1–2, 9, 23, 37 (2012) (describing the conjugal view of marriage “as an 
emotional and spiritual bond, distinguished thus by its comprehensiveness . . . ” 
and comparing “conjugal” male–female marriage to “revisionist” same-sex 
marriage throughout).  
 115. See Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, LAMBDA LEGAL (July 
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recent Supreme Court opinion on spousal relationships discussed 
only same-sex marriage.116 The movement toward marriage 
expansion and away from the conjugal definition of marriage has 
been largely based on notions of privacy and autonomy, 
jurisprudential rationales introduced into family law and well-
developed in Roe.117 The constitutional foundation for privacy was 
established in Griswold v. Connecticut,118 a case protecting 
marital privacy for contraceptive use as a liberty interest of the 
married couple.119 The marital context was abandoned, however, 
in affording that same privacy interest to unmarried persons in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird.120 That ruling served to distance marriage 
from sexual intimacy, and that privacy rationale became the 
foundation for Roe.121 This creates some correlation between Roe 
and the separation of sexual intimacy from marriage.  
The effects of Roe on marriage have worked to help turn 
marriage into an institution that reflects more individualism 
                                                                                                     
15, 2010) (last updated Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/ 
nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (listing the 
states in various categories of same-sex marriage status) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Same-sex marriage has been legalized in 
sixteen states—California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington—as well as the 
District of Columbia. Id. Same-sex civil unions have become legislatively 
equivalent to marriage in four additional states: Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, and 
Oregon. Id. 
 116. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) 
(determining that animus was the major factor in limiting marriage to opposite 
sex couples and that the limitation was therefore unconstitutional as a federal 
definition of marriage). 
 117. See Elizabeth Oklevitch & Lynne Marie Kohm, Federalism or Extreme 
Makeover of State Domestic Relations Power: The Rules and Rhetoric of Windsor 
and Perry, 6 ELON L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 118. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 119. See id. at 485–86 (invalidating the Connecticut law banning the use of 
contraceptives). 
 120. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the Court held that the 
Massachusetts law under consideration, “by providing dissimilar treatment for 
married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated . . . violate[ed] the 
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 454–455. Also, see Lynne Marie Kohm, From 
Eisenstadt to Plan B: A Discussion of Conscientious Objections to Emergency 
Contraception, 33 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 787 (2007), for further discussion of 
the marital privacy implications of Eisenstadt. 
 121. See infra Part III for further discussion on this jurisprudence. 
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than unity of two people into a new community. For many 
centuries marriage was about bridging families, but “[t]oday, we 
see marriage as a commitment between two individuals.”122 
Western culture has become “individualistic, prizing 
independence and self-fulfillment in almost all areas. We 
emphasize rights over duties and choice over obligation. This 
extends especially to marriage.”123  
The availability of abortion since Roe has also led to other 
trends in marriage, cohabitation, and divorce. The link between 
premarital sex and divorce has been highlighted by the 
availability of abortion.124 Although there are signs that some 
abstinence programs are increasingly tying marital happiness to 
premarital sexual behaviors,125 the availability of abortion as a 
contraceptive option has made premarital sex casual and easy, 
making cohabitation preferable to marriage,126 simultaneously 
                                                                                                     
 122. MEG JAY, THE DEFINING DECADE: WHY YOUR TWENTIES MATTER—AND 
HOW TO MAKE THE MOST OF THEM NOW 87 (2012). 
 123. Id. Dr. Jay continues: 
With some notable exceptions, there has never been more freedom to 
decide whether, when, and how to partner, and with whom. There is 
no question that this has led to countless happy unions, as well as the 
experience of owning one of the most important decisions of our lives. 
At the same time, the foregrounding of the individual in the 
relationships has caused us to forget about one of our greatest 
twentysomething opportunities: picking and creating our families. 
Id. at 87–88. 
 124. See Alvaré, supra note 36, at 31 (discussing the connection between 
abortion availability and premarital sex, and suggesting it is a piece of the 
divorce puzzle). Further empirical research in this area could inform the 
argument of whether abortion leads to divorce. 
 125. Id. at 53. “The influential Abstinence Clearinghouse directs its many 
members and visitors to its sophisticated website with a resource entitled 
‘Saving Sex for Marriage Reduces the Risk of Divorce.’” Id.  
 126. See JAY, supra note 122, at 89–91 (discussing the “cohabitation effect”). 
One woman said about cohabitation: “I felt like I was on this multiyear, never-
ending audition to be his wife. That made me really insecure. There was a lot of 
game-playing and arguing.” Id. at 94. Jay’s research found a unique set of 
circumstances surrounding cohabitation. 
Cohabitation in the United States has increased more than 1,500 
percent in the past fifty years. . . . This shift has largely been 
attributed to the sexual revolution and the availability of birth 
control, and certainly the economics of young adulthood play a role. 
But when you talk to twentysomethings themselves, you hear about 
something else: cohabitation as prophylaxis. 
ROE’S EFFECTS ON FAMILY LAW 1369 
weakening the moral fiber of marriage, and robbing women of the 
marriage preference. “In gaining the option of abortion, many 
women have lost the option of marriage.”127 Roe has had some 
significant effects on the spousal relationship, altering marriage, 
divorce, and marital relationships generally in ways that will 
likely become more apparent in the future. 
IV. Roe’s Effects on Sexuality, Romance, and the Family Generally 
Roe has also brought dramatic changes to relationships 
between men and women. Sexuality and privacy notions in family 
law have been expanded and modified in many ways because of 
the constitutional privacy that was developed in Roe.128 When Roe 
came to the Court in 1973, the previous decisions of Griswold and 
Eisenstadt provided easy application of privacy, combined with 
jurisprudence on autonomy, to make the way for a woman’s 
decision regarding pregnancy termination, though essentially 
derived from the penumbra of the Constitution.129 The Court’s 
ruling on sex between consenting partners in Bowers v. 
Hardwick130 was overruled as unconstitutional jurisprudence in 
Lawrence v. Texas based on Roe-like privacy notions.131 The 
privacy basis of Roe formed the foundation for new law on 
consensual sex between adults brought to bear in Lawrence.132 
                                                                                                     
Id. at 91. 
 127. Richard Stith, Her Choice, Her Problem, FIRST THINGS, 
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2009/07/her-choice-her-problem (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Stith 
completes the thought: “Liberal abortion laws have thus considerably increased 
the number of families headed by a single mother, resulting in what some 
economists call the ‘feminization of poverty.’” Id. 
 128. Supra Part III. 
 129. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, passim (1973) (citing Griswold and 
Eisenstadt throughout the opinion). 
 130. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Lawrence, the Court stated that the “petitioners 
are entitled to respect for their private lives. . . . Their right to liberty under the 
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government” and “[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate 
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of 
the individual.” Id. at 578. 
 131. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 132. See id. at 565–66 (discussing Roe’s place in the development of privacy 
jurisprudence). 
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Combined with state decisions to protect unmarried partners,133 
family law became permanently expanded to include 
relationships between unmarried members.134 
Somewhat surprisingly, some gender disparity in sexual 
freedom has arisen as a result of this jurisprudential progression 
of privacy. Some men have advocated for a paternal rights 
exception to the abortion right.135 Because abortion gives women 
more power to decide whether to procreate, some argue that men 
should possess some rights in balance of that choice; for example, 
a father might be afforded the right to decide previability to avoid 
parenthood, or agree to solely parent the child if the woman gives 
birth.136 A man could be continually promiscuous and neglect 
birth control because of abortion availability; this entails less 
cultural pressure for a man to show commitment to a woman 
following sex when the man can rightly say that she can readily 
terminate any resulting pregnancy. Some have argued that 
“emotional and psychological harm results in the infringement of 
the father’s constitutional right to privacy in procreative 
matters.”137 This passive and expressive gender inequality has 
come about because of Roe. Gender equality could be restored 
post-Roe by holding a man financially responsible for a child if it 
is presumed that he intended to father the child, such as when 
the child was conceived within a formal or common law marriage, 
or pursuant to a written contract.138  
                                                                                                     
 133. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122–23 (Cal. 1976) (finding in 
quantum meruit an equitable remedy for dissolution of unmarried 
partnerships). 
 134. See BRIAN BIX, FAMILY LAW 52 (2013) (discussing claims of unmarried 
partners based on cohabitation relationships). Although Marvin’s rationale was 
not based on family law regulations, its contract basis has become part of family 
law for the dissolution of relationships between unmarried partners. Id. 
 135. See Mary A. Totz, What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander: 
Toward Recognition of Men’s Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141, 197 
(1994) (proposing multiple approaches for men asserting paternal rights in the 
abortion decision). 
 136. Id. at 147 (noting that the legal system has not yet recognized that a 
man’s constitutional right to decide whether to beget a child should extend to 
procreative decisions made during pregnancy). 
 137. Christopher Bruno, A Right to Decide Not to Be a Legal Father: 
Gonzales v. Carhart and the Acceptance of Emotional Harm as a 
Constitutionally Protected Interest, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 141, 142 (2008). 
 138. See Totz, supra note 135, at 153 (proposing standards for a man’s 
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Courts have repeatedly ruled that if a child is born to an 
unmarried woman, the parents cannot contract to waive the 
man’s child support obligation, as such agreements are against 
public policy and void.139 Nevertheless, while denying men the 
right to act between the time of conception and viability to avoid 
the responsibilities accompanying procreation, courts have 
consistently upheld the right on behalf of women, ruling that a 
woman’s constitutional right to abort her child prior to viability is 
one she may exercise unilaterally, even if she is married.140 An 
argument can be made that these legal decisions infringe the 
man’s fundamental rights.141 “[T]he government’s requirement 
that a man pay mandatory child support for children he did not 
choose to beget, while only requiring a woman to financially 
support those children she actually decides to bear, . . . plac[es] 
an unequal statutory burden upon a man who desired not to 
procreate.”142 This argument would seem to make sense in light of 
contemporary thought tending to eliminate the complementary 
nature of gender.143 If gender is no longer binary, it would seem 
                                                                                                     
financial responsibility for a child). Conversely, “a man should not be fiscally 
responsible to provide child support if he was single and the conception was 
unintended or the result of a birth control mishap—one of the main rationales 
for a woman’s abortion right.” Id. 
 139. See id. at 158 (noting that this situation occurs more often when state 
social service agencies sue for child support on behalf of a child) (citing Okla. 
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. T.D.G., 861 P.2d 990, 994 (Okla. 1993)). 
 140. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) 
(invalidating Pennsylvania’s spousal notification law). 
 141. See Totz, supra note 135, at 158 (arguing that voiding agreements to 
waive child support and spousal notification laws amounts to an intrusion on 
“the man’s fundamental rights”).  
 142. Id. at 173−74.  
One proposed method of protecting a man’s right to avoid procreation 
is for the state to require a pregnant single woman who will be 
seeking child support to, sometime prior to viability, notify the 
putative father of her intent to carry the pregnancy to full-term. 
Upon notice, the father could decide whether or not he also wishes to 
beget the child. 
Id. at 177. 
 143. See, e.g., KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, 
COMMENTARY 871 (1993) (explaining that gender is a social construct dependent 
upon subjective individual perspective). For a discussion of that theory in a 
different context of gender equality see Lynne Marie Kohm, A Christian 
Perspective on Gender Equality, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 339, 341 (2008). 
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that the unequal treatment of two people similarly situated as 
parents promotes a violation of equal protection.144 
Placing Roe in a broader social framework illuminates the 
individual rights perspectives of sexual relationships that find 
themselves governed by family law. Some scholars examine “the 
Roe decision and its progeny from an individual rights 
perspective of both sexes,” specifically challenging Roe “in an 
[e]qual [p]rotection context.”145 There are several proposed 
solutions to the current inequities in reproductive rights, 
responsibilities, and decision-making between the sexes.146 One 
proposed solution is a “symbolic abortion” by men: “The father-to-
be would reserve the right to refuse support for the child. The 
father-to-be could simply abort himself from the situation by 
stating that he has no interest in the child-to-be, for whatever 
reason, and thus will not support the child.”147 Evident once more 
are the (un)fairness arguments that men are legally powerless in 
the abortion decision but financially responsible for unwanted 
children.148 The growing concerns of unwed and unintentional 
fathers are taken up in father’s rights advocacy.149  
                                                                                                     
 144. See Totz, supra note 135, at 182–83 (arguing that the man “should have 
an equal say as to whether or not fetal development will continue”). 
One of the inherent paradoxes of a woman’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy, is that in protecting the individual privacy of a woman 
from government intrusion, and by allowing her to make the ultimate 
decision of whether or not to bear a child, the Supreme Court has 
effectively intruded into the man’s fundamental right to decide 
whether or not he will beget a child. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 145. Illya D. Lichtenberg & Jack Baldwin LeClair, Advocating Equal 
Protection for Men in Reproductive Rights and Responsibilities, 38 S.U. L. REV. 
53, 53–54 (2010). 
 146. See id. at 73–74 (discussing the disparate rights and responsibilities of 
men and women when it comes to reproduction, and proposing solutions). 
 147. Id. at 75. 
 148. See id. at 63−67 (noting that although there is now no cultural stigma 
of unwed motherhood, there is still the strong stigma of a “dead beat dad”). 
 149. See Bryn Anne Poland, He Said, She Said: Diverging Views in the 
Emerging Field of Fathers’ Rights, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 163, 163–64 (2006) (noting 
the growth of fathers’ rights advocacy groups). Unwed fathers are using these 
historic cases to argue for more parental rights prior to the birth of a child. 
Potential fathers are aligning themselves on both sides of the debate; some 
attempt to use Roe v. Wade to terminate their parental responsibilities, while 
others attempt to use their status as a potential parent under the Fourteenth 
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Some unwed fathers have attempted to sue the women they 
have impregnated for fraud,150 the theory being that “[a]lthough a 
suit for fraud against a mother would not terminate a father’s 
parental responsibilities, men who successfully pursued tort 
claims for fraud could theoretically use the money damages from 
the claim to meet those parental responsibilities.”151 These cases 
do not provide a consistent approach and the fraud claims 
typically have been unsuccessful,152 but they nonetheless reveal 
the alteration to gender relations and gender roles that has 
occurred since and as a consequence of Roe. On the other hand, 
some potential fathers have sought a permanent injunction 
prohibiting the mother from receiving an abortion.153 So far, 
autonomy and privacy have trumped this approach based on the 
fact that a child is conceived and grows inside a woman’s body.  
Men have also argued for their rights using the tort of 
conversion as a way to provide compensation for the loss of a 
child when a mother receives an abortion against the wishes of 
the potential father.154 Almost as if to revive the old doctrines of 
parental ownership of a child as his or her property, some men 
argue that although a fetus is not considered a person with 
constitutional rights until months after conception, a father 
retains a property interest in the fetus from the moment of 
conception.155 By aborting a fetus, the mother has converted the 
potential father’s property interest, and he should be allowed to 
                                                                                                     
Amendment to prohibit a pregnant woman from terminating her pregnancy. Id. 
at 164. 
 150. Id. at 170 (citing In re Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982)). Poland adopts a definition of fraud as “an intentional, 
knowing misrepresentation, reliance upon which causes another person injury.” 
Id. (citation omitted). She asserts that the fraud claim would be “based on the 
‘injury’ of the father being forced into paying child support.” Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.; see also Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Sexual Partner’s Tort Liability 
to Other Partner for Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or Use of 
Birth Control Resulting in Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 301 (1992) (focusing on tort 
claims of fraud and misrepresentation). 
 153. Poland, supra note 149, at 170–71. 
 154. See Totz, supra note 135, at 225–26 (outlining the theory behind a 
conversion action). 
 155. See id. (relying on rationale from in-vitro fertilization cases to assert 
that the fetus is the parents’ property). 
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pursue monetary damages against the mother.156 Cultural conflict 
in the areas of sexuality are observable broadly in culture157 and 
are inevitably reflected in relationships between men and women; 
these conflicts are in greater and more direct divergence because 
of Roe and the abortion option, and the major dynamics of 
sexuality that have been altered as a result. 
Women’s rights, though thought by many to be dependent on 
reproductive choice,158 have been limited by Roe. That fact has 
been argued by feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon in her 
critique of Roe’s extension of the privacy right to abortion.159 She 
posits that abortion does not afford women more authority over 
sexual activity or reproductive choice, but rather that “[a]bortion 
facilitates women’s heterosexual availability.”160 “Assuming that 
the feminist analysis of sexuality is [an] analysis of gender 
inequality,” MacKinnon argues that “abortion is inextricable from 
sexuality.”161 Reasoning that the arguments of both pro-choice 
and pro-life positions assume that women control sex, MacKinnon 
asserts that feminist investigations prove otherwise, and that 
                                                                                                     
 156. See id. at 226 (describing the potential father’s property interest as a 
future interest). 
 157. See generally STEVEN SEIDMAN, EMBATTLED EROS: SEXUAL POLITICS AND 
ETHICS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1992). This author presents a sophisticated 
analysis of the major dynamics and patterns of the contemporary debate on 
sexuality as two sexual ideologies: the libertarian—where sex has no moral 
connection—and the romanticist—where sex is about romance and morality, 
including abortion. Id. at 5–7. He suggests a pragmatic sexual ethic of sexual 
and social responsibility as a bridge between libertarians and romanticists, 
arguing that mutual consent cannot provide the only basis for limiting sexual 
expression, but that a sexual ethic should take account of the qualitative aspects 
of sexual and social change. Id. at 206–07. He notes that in the 1990s Americans 
were divided on virtually every issue surrounding sexuality; now, however, 
though the sexual sphere is so entangled that it defies both description and 
analysis, he seems able to clarify some of the major dynamics, conflicts, and 
patterns of contemporary American intimate culture. Id. at 211–14. 
 158. See Lynne Marie Kohm, The Challenges of Teaching Gender Equality in 
an Age of Gendercide, 6 REGENT J.L. PUB. POL’Y 1, 20–23 (2013) (discussing the 
notion promoted in nearly all of legal education and feminist jurisprudence that 
women’s rights rest on the abortion foundation) (manuscript on file with the 
author).  
 159. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 107, at 102 (asserting that 
“[w]hen women are segregated in private separated from each other,  . . . a right 
to privacy isolates us at once from each other and from public recourse”). 
 160. Id. at 99. 
 161. Id. at 93. 
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women do not control sex.162 While contraception would be a 
better choice for a woman who wants to avert an abortion, 
“[n]orms of sexual rhythm and romance that are felt interrupted 
by women’s needs are constructed against women’s interests.”163 
MacKinnon notes that courts use the privacy rubric to connect 
contraception and abortion to promote an increasing freedom for 
women from government intrusion,164 but under current 
conditions of gender inequality, however, sexual liberation does 
not free women. Rather “[t]he availability of abortion removes the 
one remaining legitimized reason that women have had for 
refusing sex besides the headache.”165 
In this way abortion alters a woman’s bargaining power in 
romance and sexuality. “Legalized abortion was supposed to 
grant enormous freedom to women, but it has had the perverse 
result of freeing men and trapping women.”166 Because “[e]asy 
access to abortion has increased the expectation and frequency of 
sexual intercourse . . . among young people, it is more difficult for 
a woman to deny herself to a man without losing him,”167 as the 
“presence in the sexual marketplace of women willing to have an 
abortion reduces an individual woman’s bargaining power.”168 
                                                                                                     
 162. See id. at 94–95 (“Feminism has found that women feel compelled to 
preserve the appearance—which acted upon, becomes the reality—of male 
direction of sexual expression . . . .”)   
 163. Id. at 95 (discussing a woman’s need to interrupt a romantic interlude 
to prepare for protected sex that would help to avoid an abortion in the context 
of the pressures not to do so because she does not control the sex). 
 164. See id. at 96 (citing Roe, and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), as 
two Supreme Court cases delineating the limits on the government’s duties not 
to intervene and to intervene in a woman’s decision whether to terminate her 
pregnancy). 
 165. Id. at 99. 
 166. Stith, supra note 127. Stith credits radical feminist Catherine 
MacKinnon’s prescience on the effects of Roe as a decision that would largely 
benefit men, stating the “‘men control sexuality’ and ‘Roe does not contradict 
this.’” Id. Stith writes,  
Perhaps that is why, she observed, “the Playboy Foundation has 
supported abortion rights from day one.” In the end, MacKinnon 
pronounced, Roe’s “right to privacy looks like an injury got up as a 
gift,” for “virtually every ounce of control that women won” from 
legalized abortion “has gone directly into the hands of men.” 
Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. Stith notes that an economic environment that “employs mainly 
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Therefore, the availability of abortion has led to a casual sexual 
culture, as abortion as a method of birth control has eliminated a 
potential natural consequence of premarital sex. Abortion, then, 
makes possible casual sexual attitudes characterized in a hookup 
culture. 
This casual sexual culture has become the focus of some 
interesting research. In her book Sex and the Soul169 on the 
intersection of faith and sexual experiences of college students, 
Donna Freitas discusses the problems created by casual sexual 
values. “The problem was that the hookup culture promoted 
reckless, unthinking attitudes and expectations about sex, 
divorcing it from their larger value commitments—religious, 
spiritual, or otherwise.”170 Although Freitas never explicitly 
considers abortion, her research deals in particularity with the 
casual sexual culture college students are faced with today. She 
reports that the students she interviewed were weary and 
fatigued by their sexual experiences. “After a few years of living 
in this environment they felt exhausted, spent, emptied by the 
pressure to participate in encounters that left them 
unfulfilled.”171 This pressure Freitas refers to, though experienced 
by both male and female students in her study,172 seems to 
provide an example of the lack of power MacKinnon observes in 
the notion that women are unable to control sex.173 Freitas was 
surprised by her findings, particularly of disempowerment. 
                                                                                                     
men, leaving women dependent on economic handouts,” creates an environment 
in which “women will be much less likely to resist male pressures to make use of 
abortion. Wherever men make women’s decisions for them, the option of 
abortion will be a man’s choice, regardless of how the law may label it.” Id. at 8. 
 169. DONNA FREITAS, SEX AND THE SOUL: JUGGLING SEXUALITY, SPIRITUALITY, 
ROMANCE, AND RELIGION ON CAMPUS xv (Oxford U. Press 2008).  
 170. Id. at xv. Some of those value commitments were expressed through 
child-bearing secured by marriage (although it should be noted that Freitas 
characterizes her students’ attitudes toward a procreation-only view of sex and 
marriage as “outdated” and “unrealistic,” id. at 196). See Stith, supra note 127 
(discussing the duty a man understood in offering marriage to a woman in the 
event of pregnancy prior to Roe). 
 171. FREITAS, supra note 169, at xv. 
 172. Freitas’ study used a sample of twenty women and one man; it also 
touches on hookup remorse from male students as well. Id. at 153. 
 173. See MacKinnon, supra note 107, at 93–99 (describing the further 
gender disempowerment that abortion promotes and arguing that “women do 
not control access to [their] sexuality”). 
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At first, I was taken aback by students’ stories about the party 
scene and the degrading experiences that many of them, 
especially the women, endured regularly. We are ostensibly 
living in the era of feminism and post-sexual revolution. 
Weren’t my students supposed to be beneficiaries of these 
movements, empowered and in control of their sexuality? I was 
even more surprised to learn exactly how powerless they felt to 
change this culture that made them so unhappyat least 
before they realized that the person next to them (and the 
person next to that person) wished she or he could change 
things, too.174 
Because women have the right to an abortion, sexual 
intercourse and the choice to abort in the event of pregnancy can 
be often presumed. Clark Forsythe, Senior Counsel for Americans 
United for Life, argues that Roe has not solved the problems it 
was supposed to solve for women.175 He argues that the 
availability of abortion has not reduced spousal abuse176 or 
poverty for women,177 nor provided better job opportunities 
necessarily.178 Rather, the paradigm of liberty and control has 
essentially magnified the power of uncommitted men, 
“leverag[ing] male influence over women and damag[ing] male–
female relationships.”179 Furthermore, abortion has provided a 
way, unwittingly, for women to annihilate the future of their own 
gender in rampant gendercide occurring in nations around the 
world.180 Family law is largely designed to provide for the 
                                                                                                     
 174. FREITAS, supra note 169, at xviii. 
 175. CLARK FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION: THE INSIDE STORY OF ROE V. 
WADE 310−11 (2013).  
 176. See id. at 323 (“Whatever the risk of spousal abuse in 1973, the risk for 
women has been replaced by increasing rates of domestic abuse of women—by 
uncommitted men.”). “Numerous incidents have been publicized where men 
assault women for not having an abortion; and data suggest that these incidents 
are not rare.” Id. at 323–24. 
 177. See id. at 316 (comparing poverty rates in families with married 
couples to poverty rates in “female-headed families with children”). 
 178. See id. at 316–18 (discussing employment opportunity for women since 
Roe). 
 179. Id. at 321. Forsythe has also argued that the pro-life community bears 
the burden of civility in the abortion debate. For a review of that work, see 
Lynne Marie Kohm, Restoring the Lost Virtue of Prudential Justice to the Life 
Debate, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 191 (2009). 
 180. See Kohm, supra note 117 (noting the gender imbalances in major 
world nations revealing the vast annihilation of baby girls by reproductive 
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protection of vulnerable family members; those members are 
most often women and children. Some of these effects might not 
technically be characterized as impacts upon family law, but their 
effects are nonetheless detrimental to women, which has an 
indirect effect on the strength of family law regulations designed 
to protect women.  
Roe has also been a factor in the breakdown of romance. The 
availability of abortion created a disconnect between sexual 
intercourse and procreation, removing or causing to disappear a 
level of sexual caution that dating relationships generally benefit 
from in terms of emotional protection.181 While not addressing 
abortion, Dr. Meg Jay speaks candidly and caringly to young men 
and women on their choices in dating, cohabitation, marriage, 
and becoming parents, particularly describing the problems 
presented by managing sexuality and fertility.182 Jay posits that 
young women and men have been made more vulnerable in a 
variety of ways due to the many options for sexual intimacy now 
available to them.183 Romance is sometimes lost in a culture of 
sexual expectations, 184 which may sometimes leave the parties 
emotionally harmed.185 Those expectations of immediate intimacy 
                                                                                                     
technology and choice).  
 181. See FREITAS, supra note 169, at 93–97 (discussing the benefits of 
romance and emotional closeness in sexual encounters). 
 182. See JAY, supra note 122, at 69–79 (describing the experiences and 
problems of numerous twenty-something men and women). Jay quotes feminist 
theorist Germaine Greer: “The management of fertility is one of the most 
important functions of adulthood.” Id. at 175. 
 183. See id. at 75–79 (noting that men and women cohabitate for many 
reasons, some of which include economy, convenience, and sexual intimacy). 
However, “[l]iving with someone may have benefits, but approximating 
marriage is not necessarily one of them,” as many cohabitants do so for fun, 
rather than for added responsibility. Id. at 89–95. 
 184. See, e.g., Jeremy Nicholson, Unrealistic Relationship Expectations: 
Learning from Don Jon, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 29, 2013), http://www. 
psychologytoday.com/blog/the-attraction-doctor/201309/unrealistic-relationship-
expectations-learning-don-jon (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (discussing sexual 
expectations in the context of media portrayals) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 185. Elizabeth Armstrong, Laura Hamilton & Paula England, Is Hooking 
Up Bad for Women?, CONTEXTS (Aug. 2010), http://contexts.org/articles/summer-
2010/is-hooking-up-bad-for-young-women/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) 
(discussing the empirical evidence of the dangers and benefits of casual sex for 
women) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). While the authors 
note that “[t]he most commonly encountered disadvantage of hookups . . . is that 
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are made more possible by the availability and opportunity to 
remove an unwanted pregnancy.186 The result is that rather than 
enjoying reproductive freedom, women have been disadvantaged 
by the negative effect of Roe on what used to be romantic 
attachments, thereby placing women at a disadvantage in terms 
of relational issues.187 Sexual liberty, postmodern sexual freedom, 
and the hookup culture have not necessarily supported women or 
their exercise of their rights as women.188 Roe allowed abortion to 
become a backstop for failed contraception, which had the 
unintended consequence of facilitating the sexual exploitation of 
women and resulting in increased rates of unintended pregnancy 
and abortion.189 
                                                                                                     
sex in relationships is far better for women” the authors also list a number of 
advantages of casual sex that some women have reported: that boyfriends tend 
to get in the way of their studies and the fact that they do not have to expend 
emotional energy that might otherwise be required for a relationship. Id.  
 186. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of Abortion 
Legalization on Sexual Behavior, 32 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 407, 430−32 (2003) 
(examining how easy access to abortion increased the expectation and frequency 
of sexual intercourse, as well as increased pregnancies and sexually transmitted 
infections). 
 187. Stith points this out in the context of marital expectations in a 
relationship:  
Prior to the legalization of abortion in the United States, it was 
commonly understood that a man should offer a woman marriage in 
case of pregnancy, and many did so. But with the legalization of 
abortion, men started to feel that they were not responsible for the 
birth of children and consequently not under any obligation to marry. 
In gaining the option of abortion, many women have lost the option of 
marriage. 
Stith, supra note 127, at 9. 
 188. Stith strongly asserts that abortion availability leaves the woman as 
the only responsible party, as “the father and the doctor and the health-
insurance actuary can point a finger at her as the person” responsible for “an 
inconvenient human being;” and that abortion availability “makes women’s 
claims for better working conditions lose a measure of legitimacy.” Id. at 10. Jay 
is subtler in her approach to empowerment, discussing dating, cohabitation, 
“dating down,” and the timing of choosing a marriage partner in a culture of 
casual intimacy. See JAY, supra note 122, at 93. 
 189. See E-mail from Dorinda Bordlee, Vice President & Chief Counsel of 
the Bioethics Def. Fund, to author (Jun. 17, 2013, 3:46 PM) (noting that “Roe 
and Casey embodied a flawed radical feminist philosophy that made abortion a 
backstop for failed contraception—which had the unintended consequence of 
facilitating the sexual exploitation of women and resulting in increased rates of 
unintended pregnancy and abortion.”) (on file with author). This idea originated 
with Dorinda Bordlee. Though it was not possible for her to participate in this 
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Women are also compromised in their relationships with men 
by their own acquiescence to arguments made by a lover based on 
the availability of abortion.190 Because a woman can get an 
abortion, it can be assumed by a lover that she will do so to keep 
the relationship free of responsibility. “Children were the tangible 
proof of romance; evidence of the success, even moral correctness, 
of romantic love. But abortion breaks the age old connections 
between love, sex, marriage, and procreation; it does so, both 
actually and in the stories we tell.”191 Romantic relationships 
have, as a direct result of abortion availability, become more 
sexually focused in culture generally.192 Abortion “throws new 
narrative twists into our stories of love, exposing uncertainties 
that have been in our most intimate relationships all along” 
193but now those uncertainties highlight sexual intimacy 
without consequence (other than possible physical evidence and 
emotional sting).194 The realities of life post-Roe impact women 
negatively and can be factors that might keep a woman from 
pursuing legal action against a man that has fathered her 
child.195 Roe’s effects on sexuality and intimate partner 
                                                                                                     
Symposium, Bordlee’s initial work focused more generally upon Roe’s harmful 
impact upon women. But cf. Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional 
Conflict and the Spread of Woman Protective Anti-Abortion Arguments, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 1641, 1688–90 (2008) (objecting to arguments and policies that claim 
abortion harms women, and labeling them as “gender-paternalist”). 
 190. See Stith, supra note 127, at 8 (“To the degree that a culture is built on 
machismo, for example, the legalization of abortion will make women relatively 
worse off by giving men another tool to manipulate women as sex objects.”). 
 191. CARA J. MARIANNA, ABORTION: A COLLECTIVE STORY 53 (2002). 
 192. See Stith, supra note 127, at 7 (“Easy access to abortion has increased 
the expectation and frequency of sexual intercourse (including unprotected 
intercourse) among young people, making it more difficult for a woman to deny 
herself to a man without losing him, thus increasing pregnancies and sexually 
transmitted infections.” (citing Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect 
of Abortion Legalization on Sexual Behavior: Evidence from Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 407 (2003))). 
 193. MARIANNA, supra note 191, at 53. 
 194. See id. at 52–53 (discussing the story of one woman who states that she 
fell in love three times and each time got pregnant as proof of the love affair, so 
to speak, yet obtained an abortion because the relationships did not last). 
 195. See Serrin M. Foster, What If Her Partner, Friends, or Family Have 
Abandoned Her? Or What If She Is Poor?, HUMAN LIFE OF WASH., 
http://www.humanlife.net/view_qnr.htm?qid= 16 (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) 
(“Lack of support often coerces women into abortion.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Stith, supra note 127, at 8 (discussing how 
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jurisprudence have affected and potentially injured relational 
aspects between men and women.196 Sexuality and privacy 
notions in family law have been expanded and modified because 
of the foundation for constitutional privacy that was developed in 
Roe and is widely applied to male–female relationships generally. 
Changes to family law generally brought about by Roe have 
also affected the family as an institution. The combination of 
legal changes from Roe in the parent–child relationship, the 
spousal relationship, and sexual relationships between men and 
women in law and culture have led to a more individual-focused 
legal environment in a family context. “Our American culture is 
experiencing later marriages, historically low birthrates, high 
abortion rates, 400,000 ‘frozen embryos’ in storage, and record 
creation of more or less temporary sexual unions resulting in high 
numbers of children at risk for the difficulties that arise in one-
parent homes.”197 Roe’s effect on laws concerning contraception 
and abortion, and particularly regarding minors’ access to 
contraception and abortion, has clearly sent messages about the 
role of sex in the lives of adolescents198 and adults, and has 
assisted in moving family law toward a set of protections of 
individual interests, rather than a code that protects and 
strengthens families. That has had an impact on family strength, 
weakening the unit generally. 
Roe has led to a host of incidental effects on the family. It has 
served to increase government involvement in the family, as 
abortion funding is now a routine part of federal family 
                                                                                                     
refusing to have an abortion may leave a woman all alone with the burden of a 
child, and society supposing she has no one to blame but herself for not making 
the abortion decision). 
 196. See, e.g., Feminists for Life America, Print Advertisement (2003) 
(saying “If SHE’s in trouble, HE’s in trouble, too” to inform women about child 
support laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mary Ziegler, 
Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-Life 
Feminism, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232 (2013) (discussing different 
positions on abortion held by pro-life feminists in an effort to identify areas of 
agreement with pro-choice feminists). 
 197. Alvaré, supra note 109, at 18. Professor Alvaré continues: “There is also 
the fact of endless media images celebrating unbridled adult sexual choices. In 
sum, it is a culture in which human sexuality appears to be viewed through the 
lens of adult desires, with the unwanted consequences of disease and pregnancy 
spoken of in the same breath.” Id. 
 198. Id. at 47. 
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assistance.199 Recent Health and Human Services (HHS) 
regulations for the Affordable Care Act mandate that 
contraception, sterilization, Plan B, Mifropristone, and other 
nonsurgical pharmaceutical abortion medication be available and 
paid for by employers,200 often regardless of an employer’s pro-
family faith perspectives.201 Roe has also propagated a method of 
limiting families that has revealed its racial disparity.202 It has 
also changed how family law is taught in legal education.203 
Families and individuals can reconsider their family planning 
strategy because of the possibility of abortion used as selective 
pregnancy reduction in assisted reproduction techniques.204 It 
could be argued that the value of a child individually and to his or 
                                                                                                     
 199. See Nat’l Network of Abortion Funds, Can Medicaid Cover My 
Abortion?, FUND ABORTION NOW, http://www.fundabortionnow.org/get-
help/Medicaid (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (listing fifteen states as providing 
abortion funding through Medicaid: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 200. See Preventive Services Covered Under the Affordable Care Act, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ 
healthcare/facts/factsheets/2010/07/preventive-services-list.html (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2014) (listing contraception among the preventive services offered for 
adult women) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kelly Cleland 
et al., Family Planning as a Cost-Saving Preventive Health Service, 364 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. e37(1), (2)–(3) (2011) (discussing new provisions of the Affordable 
Care Act). 
 201. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 
2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (remanding for consideration of a 
preliminary injunction for a secular corporation challenging the Affordable Care 
Act’s contraception mandate). 
 202. See Mary Ann Engel, Abortion Rate Down but Racial Disparity Up, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/23/science/sci-
abortion23 (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (citing a Guttmacher Report 
demonstrating that black abortions occur five times more frequently than white 
abortions, and Hispanic abortions occur three times more frequently than white 
abortions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 203. See Lynne Marie Kohm & Lynn D. Wardle, The “Echo-Chamber Effect” 
in Legal Education: Considering Family Law Casebooks, 6 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 104, 105 (2011) (arguing that “there is a profound ‘echo effect’ in law 
school teaching about abortion issues in family law”). 
 204. See generally E.V. Gemmette, Selective Pregnancy Reduction: Medical 
Attitudes, Legal Implications, and a Viable Alternative, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 383 (1991) (discussing how routine the practice of selective pregnancy 
reduction—in which a doctor reduces a multiple pregnancy—has become, and 
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her family has been permanently altered.205 Families have been 
forever changed by Roe. 
V. Conclusion 
Roe has had a profound effect on family law. It has altered 
the parent–child relationship and the spousal relationship. Its 
ideology is connected or correlated to devalued marriage, 
increased divorce, increased cohabitation, and a culture of casual 
sexuality. It has changed relationships between men and women, 
perhaps permanently, and led to unique harms to women and to 
men. 
Alterations to family law brought about by Roe comprise a 
pattern of increasing individuality and a decreasing sense of 
community, even between family members related by blood or 
consanguinity. Forty years of some of the most profound changes 
to family law have occurred since Roe v. Wade. While all those 
changes may not necessarily be a direct result of that decision, a 
significant amount of these changes are manifestly effects of Roe. 
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(last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (quoting medical ethicists from Oxford as arguing 
that it is “not possible to damage a newborn by preventing her from . . . 
becom[ing] a person in the morally relevant sense” and that “what we call ‘after-
birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where 
abortion is”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
